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Abstract
A growing body of literature on the optimal allocation of resources in
controlling the spread of communicable diseases has garnered considerable
attention during the last four decades. Although such literature is relatively
unanimous formally speaking - i.e., marrying tools of optimal control the-
ory with epidemiological nonlinear models - it has been quite polarized over
both the theoretical question of the choice of time scale (i.e., discrete versus
continuous) and, relatedly, the question of the most adequate optimization
tool (Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle versus Bellman’s Dynamic Program-
ming) to be employed in determining the lowest-cost policy for containing
and eradicating the infection. This thesis theoretically investigates the roots
of the discrepancies that exist between these two divided bodies of litera-
ture, seeking for ways to reconcile the results that are obtained by these two
different approaches. The central analysis focuses on two pairs of articles on
the control of SIS infections: i) two classical articles written in the 1970s that
disagree on the pulsing behavior of the optimal policy over discrete and con-
tinuous time, and ii) two recent articles that examine the optimal allocation
of funds between multiple connected populations when the social planner
faces tight budgets, pointing out the difficulties that arise in analytically
iv
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solving the problem in continuous time. The implications of this theoret-
ical investigation extend to similar models in topics as diverse as fishery
management, corruption control, and crime prevention, while its practical
contribution lies in carefully prescribing optimal intervention strategies for
public health policymakers.
Keywords: optimal control - SIS model - time scale - Pontryagin’s Maxi-
mum Principle - dynamic programming - strong Legendre-Clebsch necessary
condition - Green’s theorem - convergence of solutions - tight budgets - pub-
lic health.
Acknowledgments
This thesis project – my first glimpse into the pleasures and pains of
scholarship – has made me aware of the great importance of being con-
stantly surrounded by people with whom I can share these pleasures and
pains throughout the process. I have been blessed with many such people
in my life. I am deeply indebted to Professor Stephen W. Salant, professor
of economics at University of Michigan, who brought the central puzzle of
this thesis to my attention and who has patiently followed, supported, and
advised my work. I would also like to thank Professor Jonathan Webster,
serving also as an advisor for my mathematics thesis, for his help through
the jungle of mathematics involved in this thesis and for being very un-
derstanding especially during the second semester of my senior year. Also,
special thanks go to both the Department of Economics and the Department
of Mathematics of Bates College, for their constant interest, support, and
help.
My sincerest gratitude and deepest love goes to the closest people in my
life: my family and my friends. Among many friends who have listened to my
ideas and cheered me on, I would like to especially thank Shlesma Chhetri,
for being particularly involved with my thesis ideas and for offering valuable
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii
insights from the perspective of a public health student. Also, the love,
dedication, optimism, and blind faith of my wonderful parents, sent across
the ocean in any possible way that human technology has known so far, has
kept me going like nothing else. Above all, I am deeply thankful to them
for teaching me the importance of a true education and for unconditionally
supporting me in pursuing it, no matter how far from home that pursuit
might take me. The presence of Gent Carrabregu, my dearest home and my
most precious intellectual básanos, is reflected in every line of this thesis; his
love, persistent confidence, and dedication in patiently listening, discussing,
and reading my ideas has been my greatest inspiration for the past three
years.
This thesis is dedicated to my advisor, Professor Michael P. Murray,
whose genuine support, thoughtful guidance, unceasing patience, and price-
less advices above and beyond this thesis work have been a major source
of strength for me this year. Words fail me in expressing my deeply felt
gratitude toward him; this thesis would have never been possible without
his mentoring, dedication, enthusiasm, and encouragement. Because of him,
I leave Bates with a clear image of the teacher and the scholar I aspire to
become one day.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Cure, no cure, half-cure?
“Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?” he asked.
“Begin at the beginning,” the King said gravely...
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll
In the increasingly interconnected world in which we live, infectious dis-
eases represent a growing threat to global public health. Not only do such
diseases remain a significant burden for most of the developing countries,
but also their emerging drug-resistant varieties present a serious source of
anxiety for the developed world. Lopez et al. (2006) have reported that
five infectious diseases (HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, lower respiratory infec-
tions, and diarrheal diseases) were among the top ten global causes of death
in 2001(Laxminarayan and Malani, 189). WHO vividly describes the mag-
nitude of the global impact of infectious diseases in these terms: “Over
the next hour alone, 1,500 people will die from an infectious disease over
half of them being children under five.”1 Furthermore, in 2008, Trust for
Americas Health published a report that announced a quite dramatic mes-
sage: At least 170,000 Americans die each year because of newly emerging
1http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/pages/textonly.html
1
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and reemerging infectious diseases, and this number is predicted to increase
significantly in the coming decades due to the development of new drug-
resistant infections, globalization, and the ongoing changes in the climate.2
The need to understand optimal ways to control the spread of these diseases,
therefore, presents itself stronger than ever in the twenty-first century.
1. Features of the economic approach to infectious diseases
The dynamics of infectious diseases3 and the public health policies aim-
ing to control these infections represent a very fruitful terrain that has only
recently been explored by economists. Although epidemiology has provided
well-equipped mathematical models of the dynamics of such infectious dis-
eases for a long time, only recently have economists taken an interest in
exploring optimal interventions to control and eradicate these diseases. The
issue of controlling the spread of such diseases, nevertheless, represents one
of the major challenges that public health policy makers face not only in
the developing world, but in the developed world as well. Hence, a deeper
formal analysis of the social costs of these infections and of the efficiency
of various interventions is of primary importance in order to have a better
2“Germs Go Global: Why Emerging Infectious Diseases Are a Threat to America”,
Trust for Americas Health. http://healthyamericans.org/report/56/germs-go-global
3Throughout this thesis, the terms infectious disease, “communicable diseases”, and
infection are used interchangeably, although there exist slight biological differences be-
tween the three.
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understanding of these infections and design more effective public health
policies.
A coherent economic modeling of infectious diseases requires a careful
evaluation of the multiple types of costs that these diseases impose upon the
populations that they invade. The loss of lives is the single most important
of these costs. While the lost lives cannot be easily assigned an equivalent
monetary value that needs to be added to the other types of costs in order
to calculate an approximate aggregate cost of the disease, often the number
of lost lives is in itself a good approximation of this aggregate cost and can
be used by itself as an objective function that needs to be minimized under
certain constraints. Secondly, the reduction in the population and the in-
ability of the infected individuals to proceed with the regular life activities
for as long as they are infected are translated into forgone output, decreased
labor productivity, and reduced consumption. Also, several scholars (Bleak-
ley (2010), Miguel and Kremer (2004), Bobonis et al. (2006) etc.) who have
contributed to the literature on the economic impact of infectious diseases
have suggested that health has an indirect effect on the investment deci-
sions regarding human capital, and hence income. A third type of impact
includes costs related to the prevention and treatment methods employed
to control the spread of the diseases. The particular (mathematical) form
of these costs varies according to the specific characteristics of the disease
and the control tools available for that disease. Lastly, because of the com-
municable nature of infectious diseases, infected individuals impose a social
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cost upon the healthy individuals, that is, individuals who have not been
infected yet, but who are susceptible to the disease due to their being sur-
rounded by potential infecting agents. This externality effect that marks
the spread of infections plays a crucial role in the dynamics that govern the
spread of the disease and, consequently, in the policies employed to control
such dynamics.
The particular characteristics of an infectious disease should be kept in
mind when attempting to model the economic dynamics and the impact of
such a disease. Infectious diseases are marked by a variety of characteris-
tics, which makes a general formulation hard to establish. In terms of its
evolution, an infection proceeds either to recovery and further susceptibil-
ity, immunity, or death. In terms of rates and modes of transmission, an
infection might be transmitted at various rates mostly via direct contact
between individuals or via vectors. The typical intervention methods used
to control an infection are prevention and therapy. The most effective pre-
vention method is vaccination, while some secondary less reliable prevention
methods include the strict application of hygiene rules, avoidance of contact
with the source of the infection etc. Therapy, on the other hand, consists
of specific anti-infection medicines, which might be designed particularly for
either early-stage or later-stage treatment of the disease. Several fatal dis-
eases, such as HIV/AIDS, can be avoided only by taking preventive measures
(so far), while for several other infections, such as cholera, malaria, and gon-
orrhea, treatment of the infected people is the only viable form of controlling
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the disease. A mix of the two intervention forms is possible for most of other
infections; this fact brings up questions about the optimal combination of
prevention and therapy, and the circumstances under which one of these
forms is superior to the other. An example of such infectious diseases is
tuberculosis: the widely-used vaccine for TB is the Bacillus Calmette-Gurin
(BCG) vaccine, while anti-TB treatment consists mostly of antibiotics such
as isoniazid and rifampicin.4 In addition, as mentioned earlier, infectious
diseases vary across their costs of intervention, as well as across the target
of the eventual intervention: the entire population, the infected, the unin-
fected, or the contact channels between the two. Therefore, facing such a
myriad of characteristics, the existing economic-epidemiological models have
focused only on selected tractable features that are crucial in the evaluation
of cost-minimizing policies.
While the economic literature on epidemiological control is growing rapidly,
the unique contribution that economists bring to this area of inquiry re-
mains unique in two directions. First and most importantly, economists
bring together behavioral choice and epidemiological dynamics to illustrate
how personal decision making affects the prevalence of an infection in a feed-
back fashion 5. Secondly, economists possess the necessary tools to frame the
problem of epidemiological control as one of “a social planner’s optimization
4World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs104/en/index.html
5By feedback fashion, I mean that personal choices are both informed by and affect
the prevalence level.
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problem” and to obtain results for the optimal interventions. The insights
that economic analysis is providing to the traditional epidemiological mod-
els are changing fundamentally the way both economists and epidemiologists
think about infection dynamics and infection control. While economic epi-
demiology has already made some substantial advances, further research on
this field is of great significance and interest.
The most widely used epidemiological compartmental model6 in the eco-
nomic literature is the SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) model. The SIS
model assumes that individuals do not become immune to the infection after
recovery; instead, they join the pool of susceptible individuals again and can
be reinfected through future contacts with infected individuals. This model
is particularly useful in describing the evolvement of diseases such as gon-
orrhea, meningitis, plague, streptococcal sore throat, malaria, and sleeping
sickness. (Anderson et al. 2011, 1) In the simplest version of the model with
a fixed population, the entire population is comprised of infected and sus-
ceptible individuals only, and individuals can move back and forth between
the states of being infected and being susceptible.7 Therefore, changes in the
number of infected individuals are driven by three main factors: 1) the rate
6The two compartments in the SIS model are: “Susceptible” and “Infected”.
7The model was first introduced by Kermack and McKendrick, in their well-known
article: Kermack, W. O. and A. G. McKendrick, (1927) “A contribution to the mathe-
matical theory of epidemics,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A, 115,
700-721.
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of spontaneous recovery of infected individuals (i.e. recovery without treat-
ment), 2) the infectiousness of the disease (the rate of susceptible-infected
contacts that cause the infection of the susceptible individual), and 3) the
fraction of the infected subpopulation that gets treated and the efficiency of
the treatment. On the other hand, a positive change in the infected subpop-
ulation implies an equal negative change in the susceptible subpopulation,
so a description of the dynamics of one of the subpopulations is sufficient (in
the simple case of fixed population). A rigorous mathematical presentation
of the SIS dynamics is presented in the next section of this chapter.
2. Advances in the literature
The growing economic literature on infectious diseases can be classified
into four main strands of research (Laxminarayan and Malani, 2011). The
first strand of the literature is the examination of the direct and indirect
impact of infectious diseases on income and economic development. A sec-
ond strand of research deals with the role that individual incentives play
in the dynamics and control of infectious diseases; the questions asked in
this neighborhood of the literature revolve mostly around three main top-
ics: 1) the correlation between the prevalence level of the disease and the
self-protective (analogously, the risk-taking) behavior displayed by the indi-
viduals that are exposed to the disease, 2) the demand for treatment and
vaccination, in light of the positive externalities that they bring to the en-
tire population, and 3) the demand for information about one’s state of the
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disease, i.e. the demand for testing, which can be either voluntary or manda-
tory. The third strand of the literature focuses on institutional and national
incentives for controlling infectious diseases, analyzing the particular con-
textual framework in which institutions and nations respond to outbreaks
of infections and the effect that the incentives arising out of such contextual
frameworks have on the optimal level of the control effort.
The fourth strand of research that has garnered considerable attention
in the literature on economics of infections is the examination of optimal
allocation of resources to control and fight communicable diseases. The first
economic articles on this topic appeared in the early 70s, when optimal
control theory and dynamic programming tools had just started to establish
their influence in the context of epidemiological models. While the work
that has been done on this topic can be classified differently using different
criteria, two of those criteria have substantially shaped the debate in this
literature: 1) the number of the populations over which the treatment effort
is optimized, and 2) the flow of time in these optimization problems (i.e.
continuous-time vs. discrete-time models). This thesis finds its inspiration
in a long-standing controversy around these two criteria.
The main focus of this thesis is centered around two classical articles
published in the early 1970s in Biometrics by Sanders (1971) and Sethi
(1974), which aim to evaluate the socially optimal level of treatment in a
single population facing linear costs of the disease–dependent on the num-
ber of infected people and the chosen treatment effort level–and inequality
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constraints in the treatment level. The two analogous optimization prob-
lems formulated in discrete time and continuous time respectively are the
following:8
(1.1)
minimize
{γt}
T
∑
t=0
αt(Cxt + Kγt)
subject to xt+1 = xt + βxt(N − xt) − γxt,
with 0 ≤ xt ≤ N, 0 ≤ γt ≤ b,
and x0 given.
(1.2)
minimize
{γt}
∫ T
0
e−αt(Cx + Kγ)
subject to
dx
dt
= βx(N − x) − γx,
with 0 ≤ xt ≤ N, 0 ≤ γt ≤ b,
and x0 given.
Notice that in the problems above, x denotes the number of infected
individuals in the population, β denotes the infectiousness rate of the disease,
N denotes the total number of the population, γ reflects the level of the
treatment effort chosen to be applied in the population, C and K represent
8The variable α is the intertemporal discount factor in discrete time. If we let α = 1
1+r
in discrete time, the corresponding continuous-time discount factor will be of the form e−r .
Notice the abuse of notation in the use of the symbol α in the discrete-time formulation
and the later continuous-time formulation.
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the marginal costs of an additional infected individual and an additional unit
of treatment level respectively, and b denotes an upper bound of the possible
treatment level that can be attained by the society due to its technological
limits. Referring to the form in which γ is incorporated in the model, Sanders
states that “the impact [of the level of program effort] is proportional to the
number infected at that time” (Sanders, 885). Finally, this formulation
of the differential/difference equation of motion deviates from the classical
Kermack-McKendick formulation in that it does not account for spontaneous
recoveries, hence it implicitly assumes that everyone that is infected will
return to his susceptible state due only to effective treatment.
The article by Sanders (1971) is one of the earliest articles on the appli-
cation of mathematical modeling techniques to the class of control problems
that are concerned with a health delivery system geared toward the elimina-
tion of a particular health problem(Sanders 1971, 883). Sanders introduced
the linear cost function of the form (Cx + Kγ), where the first term cap-
tures the overall costs that the society bears due to the x infected individuals
present in it, while the second term represents how costly a chosen level of
program effort is. This early article posed the problem in discrete time,
and employed a dynamic programming argument to solve for the optimal
treatment level. The main line of the argument is based on the crucial fact
that although the single-period costs are linear in both the infection level
(the state variable) and the treatment level (the control variable), the value
function is strictly concave with respect to the infection level due to the
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concave SIS equation of motion, which enters the argument because of the
forward-looking nature of dynamic programming. Concavity ensures that
the optimal policy will be of a bang-bang form, i.e. the treatment level in
any period within the considered finite horizon will be either at the maxi-
mal level or at the minimal level, but never at an intermediate one. A social
planner should either choose to apply the maximum treatment effort that
the society is capable of, or he should not intervene at all in the proliferation
of the disease.
Sethi responded to the discrete-time solution offered by Sanders by trans-
ferring the problem in continuous time in the form of Equation (1.2). In
justifying his decision to transfer the problem to another time framework,
he argued that dynamic programming,–the continuous form of which was
highly unexplored at the time–was the problematic optimization tool em-
ployed by Sanders that led to faulty results. On the other hand, Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, originally introduced in its continuous form (and whose
discrete version was formulated rigorously only several years later), was the
preferred continuous-time solution method at the time. He employed Miele’s
interpretation of Green’s theorem in extremization of line integrals in order
to solve for an optimal intermediate level of treatment in the case when the
upper bound b is large enough. He then returned to the method of switching
functions–widely explored and used in the late 1960s as a tool of identifying
singular solutions when the Hamiltonian is linear in the control,–to prove
the optimality of the singular solution in a more general setting.
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While there is no obvious reason why the method of dynamic program-
ming fails to produce the correct optimal control path in discrete time, the
singular control path that Sethi identifies as optimal in continuous time
openly disappoints our pre-conceived intuition that optimal solutions in dis-
crete time and continuous time should be of similar form, even if obtained
via different optimization methods. Taking for granted that both methods
have been applied correctly – an assumption which will be carefully scruti-
nized in the next chapter – this discrepancy between the solutions in discrete
and continuous time might possibly result from the special structure of this
particular optimization problem. Anderson and Salant (2011) consider the
discrete-time problem introduced above and check the optimality of the sin-
gular (turnpike) solution identified by Sethi in discrete time. They do so
by supposing that when the level of the infection is at the turnpike level, a
small perturbation h from the singular policy should increase the costs of
the program as the singular control is supposedly the optimal policy. They
conclude that in this discrete-time framework, Sethi has mistaken a local
maximum for a global minimum, because any perturbation around h = 0
produces lower costs than the case of h = 0. This is a very important re-
sult towards the goal of understanding the source of the differences between
the policies suggested by Sethi and Sanders, but notice that this analysis
is strictly limited to the discrete-time framework. In other words, Ander-
son and Salant have shown that the intermediate level solution proposed by
Sethi is not optimal in the discrete-time formulation of Sethi’s problem, but
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this does not imply much about the continuous-time framework in which he
originally operates.
This debate has been enriched further only recently with the emergence
of a new gap in the literature, seemingly related to the first one. Considering
a similar optimization problem of linear cost and SIS dynamics, Rowthorn
et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2011) analyze the case of the optimal al-
location of a tight budget between two subpopulations of a fixed population
living in two interconnected regions in continuous and discrete time, respec-
tively. Rowthorn et al. conclude via numerical methods that the optimal
path to pursue is to allocate treatment to the subpopulation with the lower
level of infection. They point out a major technical difficulty in formulat-
ing analytical solutions for optimal control problems that involve the SIS
model: because the SIS model of disease dynamics contains a nonconvexity,
the standard use of sufficiency conditions to find an analytical solution fails.
Therefore, they turn to numerical approximation methods in order to obtain
an optimal solution for this problem. While unable to pin down analytical
optimal solutions for their model, the authors still manage to analytically
prove that the worst possible path is to adjust treatment levels that equalize
the level of infection in each subpopulation. Anderson et al. address this
technical difficulty by introducing the assumption of tight budgets 9 and
9This discussion will consider the case of tight budgets only when the transfer of funds
across time in the form of borrowing or lending is not possible. The relaxation of this
assumption and its implications present an interesting path for further research.
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employing a modified dynamic programming approach to obtain analytical
solutions for the discrete-time social planner’s problem. The article models
the budget-allocation decisions that a health authority makes in controlling
and combating an SIS-governed infectious disease that spreads in a finite
number of unconnected and interconnected populations (analogous to the
subpopulations in the model of Rowthorn et al). The health authority has
to decide how many infected people from each population should be treated
in every time period. The case of a tight budget granted every period of time
and the case of a certain amount of wealth granted only at the beginning
are discussed separately in the paper. The aim of the health authority is to
minimize the discounted social cost of the infection in all the populations,
which is expressed as a linear combination of the respective infection levels.
The authors conclude that it is optimal, under a tight budget, to focus en-
tirely on one group at a time, rather than treating infected individuals from
several groups simultaneously. In this sense, the optimal solution that they
propose is of a bang-bang form: interior solutions–that is, combinations of
treatment effort in two or more subpopulations in the same time period–are
never optimal. Furthermore, they argue that the groups that should have
priority in receiving treatment are those with the lowest levels of infection.
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3. Questions and structure of the thesis
The main goal of this thesis is to synthesize a unified understanding of
the optimal policies that need to be followed in controlling infectious dis-
eases, focusing on the infections whose dynamics are governed by the SIS
epidemiological model. The discussion develops separately along two main
strands: 1) the attempt to bridge the gap between the discrete-time and the
continuous-time frameworks offered by Sanders and Sethi, by examining pos-
sible ways of resolving their disagreement on whether the optimal treatment
level follows a bang-bang path or a singular path, and 2) the implications
that the earlier debate between Sethi and Sanders has on the extension of
the modified discrete-time dynamic programming approach used by Ander-
son et al. to continuous time in order to overcome the difficulties identified
by Rowthorn et al. (or alternatively, the exploration of potential virtues of
the discrete-model that might allow the approach to be successful in discrete
time but not in continuous time).
The major questions that will guide the discussion throughout this work
can be categorized in three general families of questions:
• What are the particular features of this optimization problem, how
are these features affected by the chosen time scale, and how do
these features contribute to potential incongruence between optimal
solutions in discrete and continuous time? From a chronological
standpoint, have the methods of calculus of variations, optimal
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control theory, and dynamic programming been able to cope with
this particular type of problem successfully in the past, and if so,
how?
• Is the disagreement between Sethi and Sanders a purely method-
ological one–that is, is either Pontryagin’s maximum principle or
Bellman’s dynamic programming particularly ill-suited to this type
of problem due to their classical underlying assumptions,–or is
their disagreement rooted more deeply into a potential time-step-
dependent nature of the optimal solution? How do continuous dy-
namic programming and the discrete maximum principle handle
the problem? In the spirit of the discrete-time variations around
the steady-state solution used by Anderson and Salant, can we find
a continuous-time numerical example of an extremal policy that
dominates the steady-state solution offered by Sethi? How do the
strategies of chattering and pulsing, which are more similar to a
continuous-time version of the optimal solution offered by Sanders,
perform compared to the steady-state solution identified by Sethi?
• How is the problem formulated by Sethi and Sanders similar and/or
different from the problem formulated by Rowthorn et al. and An-
derson et al.? Can the solution method offered by Sethi in contin-
uous time help with the problem posed by Rowthorn et al.? Do we
expect similar divergences between optimal solutions in different
time frameworks for this problem as well? How can the modified
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dynamic programming approach offered by Anderson et al. for the
discrete-time problem be extended in continuous time?
This thesis is organized in five chapters; the introductory chapter you are
reading now is the first one. Chapter 2 offers a technical discussion of the
major mathematical concepts, techniques, and proofs useful for the rest of
this work. Chapter 3, which is the most substantial chapter of this thesis,
offers an analysis of the disagreement between Sanders and Sethi, providing
some attempts to identify potential sources of this disagreement and connect
the work of the two. Chapter 4 turns to the more recent pairs of papers by
Rowthorn et al. and Anderson et al., attempting to apply lessons drawn from
Chapter 3 to the discrepancy between solutions in discrete and continuous
time identified in these papers. The fifth chapter concludes this work with a
summary of useful technical results, policy recommendations, and persistent
old and new questions.
4. Further comments on the relevance of this work
The theoretical assumptions made in the articles that will be discussed
extensively in this thesis and the questions that are built upon those as-
sumptions are not of academic interest only. They are motivated by actual
economic aspects of infectious diseases. In this section, we provide some
facts to illustrate this point.
Sanders provides an example of an infectious disease that illustrates his
assumption about the cost function that he chooses to use in his model.(Sanders
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1971, 887) Trachoma, a disease that is highly prevalent among the Papago
Indian people of Southern Arizona, is a disease that affects the cornea of the
eye and if not treated on time, can degrade to complete vision loss. Con-
sidering data from a trachoma control program that was applied in school
age children in the San Xavier Reservation during the period 1964-1967,
he interprets the variable γ in his model as the screening effort needed to
identify the infected individuals in the population, and Kγ as the cost of a
total screen. Furthermore, he argues that other assumptions of the model
are very realistic in this setting as well, such as the fact that: a)there is
no immune state for trachoma, i.e. people that have been treated once are
still susceptible to it, b)the population is naturally isolated, c)the infected
and the susceptible subpopulations are not isolated from each-other, d)the
program predicted a regular screening procedure every 6 months, and e)the
treatment used in treating people diagnosed with the disease is effective only
in about 60 percent of the cases.
The literature on the optimal treatment level in a single population is
particularly relevant to endemic infectious diseases that prevail in isolated
populations. The case of trachoma is one illustration of such endemic infec-
tions. Furthermore, the issue of controlling infections in one population is
fundamental for decision making at the level of national health ministries.
On the other hand, the issue of treating multiple connected (sub)populations
simultaneously is of great interest in the context of globalization and the
4. FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THIS WORK 19
need to control communicable diseases across boundaries. International pol-
icy making institutions, such as WHO, are continually interested on how to
divide funds across several countries or regions with different prevalence
levels of the same disease.
Also, the assumption of tight budgets that Anderson et al. make in their
article (which then allows them to establish an analytical solution for the
problem) is consistent with the limited treatment resources that countries
and organizations possess. It is quite unrealistic to suppose that we can treat
every infected individual at the same time. As Laxminarayan and Malani
(199) point out, there is not enough funds to treat everybody that has been
infected by a disease, even for a disease such as HIV which has absorbed
enormous funds for treatment over years. Another illustration of this point
comes from Zambia. Zambia has one of the best-funded malaria programs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, yet the percentage of the children who receive effective
treatment does is not higher than 13 percent.
To conclude, the relevance of this work lies in three main directions.
First, the reconciliation of the discrete-time and continuous-time optimal
solutions for the type of optimization problems with linear objective func-
tion and nonlinear dynamics is of theoretical interest. This type of problems
is widely used in contexts where population dynamics need to be modeled.
Secondly, the results of this thesis might be particularly useful for public
health practitioners, whose work constantly aims to control diseases that
spread in continuous time through decisions made in discrete time. The
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examples described above argue further about the relevance of this problem
for the public health field. Thirdly, similar types of problems arise in other
subfield of economics as well, such as resource economics, economics of cor-
ruption etc. A better understanding of the problem at hand will possibly
shed light on solutions to these other problems as well.
CHAPTER 2
Mathematical preliminaries
“Calculus required continuity, and continuity was supposed to require the
infinitely little; but nobody could discover what the infinitely little might be.”
Bertrand Russell
“I turn with terror and horror from this lamentable scourge of continuous
functions with no derivatives.”
Charles Hermite, in a letter to Thomas de Stieltjes
In this chapter, several techniques and results that are important math-
ematical prerequisites to the analysis developed in the next two chapters
will be reviewed. The chapter serves two purposes: 1) the general introduc-
tion of basic ideas in optimization, and 2) the exposition of some particular
mathematical results that are directly related to our problem of interest.
Section 1 and 2 offer a brief discussion of dynamic programming, the Maxi-
mum Principle, and the connection between the two. Section 3 explains the
basic technique of extremization of line integrals by means of Green’s theo-
rem. Section 4 reviews the particular features of singular control problems,
following the classic work of Bell and Jacobson (Bell and Jacobson, 1975).
Section 5, 6, 7, and 8 discuss three other topics that are crucial tools in
21
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understanding the work of Sanders and Sethi discussed in the next chapter:
the current-value Hamiltonian function, Euler’s method of approximation,
the logistic nature of the SIS dynamic equation, and the discretization of
the discounting factor. Readers who are familiar with the mathematical
preliminaries may omit this chapter and go directly to the next chapter.
1. Divide and conquer: Dynamic programming
Dynamic programming – an optimization technique developed in the
mid-1950s by Richard Bellman (Bellman, 1957) – exploits the ability of
a multi-stage decision problem to be broken down in smaller optimiza-
tion subproblems that can be solved separately with greater ease. A dy-
namic programming problem is defined in terms of states, decisions (alter-
natively, actions or controls), and momentary rewards or costs. Once the
tree of states and decisions, along with accompanying rewards for each state-
decision pair, is known, we can define a sequence of value functions {Vi(x)},
which represents the optimal value of a state x at a certain moment in
time i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, given that the decision maker will act optimally from
moment i and on. This concept of a value function allows for a recursive
definition of the decision-making process, as Vi−1(x) is equal to the sum
of the one-period reward (or cost) that the agent obtains from acting opti-
mally (making decision uo 1) from time i − 1 to time i, and the subsequent
Vi(x
′), where x′ is the state that results from acting uo from state x. This
1The superscript o stands for “optimal”.
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recursive relationship is captured by Bellman’s Principle of Optimality, the
mathematical form of which will be presented in the next subsection.
1.1. The principle of optimality. Consider a deterministic system
governed by the following difference equation:
xi+1 = xi + fi(xi, ui) i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
x0 = x̄0
Notice that as N becomes infinitely large, the optimizing horizon becomes
infinite. For convenience, we consider only the finite horizon dynamic pro-
gramming problem. In the general case, the state variable xi is an n-
dimensional vector, the control variable ui is an m-dimensional vector, and
fi is an n-dimensional function of the pair (xi, ui). In order to simplify our
discussion, we will consider the case when x and u take only scalar values,
and fi is a two-dimensional function of the same form independent of i, so
fi = f for all i. Lastly, our discussion considers only the case of costs that
need to be minimized; an analogous discussion that involves rewards would
follow from this.
A control trajectory (or control path) is a sequence of control actions
over time {ui, i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1}. Similarly, a state trajectory (or state
path) is a sequence of states of the form {xi}. All the admissible control
actions form a control space C. Similarly, all the attainable states live in the
state space S.
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The cost function (or the performance index) of a system with initial
state x0 and control path {ui} is defined as:
V0(x0, {ui}) =
N−1
∑
i=0
αiCi(xi, ui) + α
NCN (xN)
where Ci represent the one-period costs, CN represents the cost of ending
up in the last state xN , and α is the discounting factor of the future costs.
The major goal of the problem is to find a control path {ui} that mini-
mizes V0(x̄0, {ui}) for any given initial state. Let {u
o
i } be the optimal control
path starting from the initial state x̄0, which results in the corresponding
state trajectory {xoi }. Let π
o = {goi } be the optimal policy, which is a se-
quence of the optimal control laws ui = gi(xi) for every period i. At this
time, we can define the optimal value function V oi (xi) to be the total future
cost of being in state xi at time i, given that the optimal policy will be fol-
lowed from period i to the last period N . Similarly, V o0 (x0) is the minimized
total cost of starting from an initial state x0.
The principle of optimality states the recursive nature of the value func-
tion:
V oi (xi) = minui [Ci(xi, ui)+αV
o
i+1(xi+f(xi, ui))] where V
o
N(xN ) = CN (xN)
This forward-looking minimization procedure will yield the optimal control
path for the remaining periods from i to N , given that the system is at
state xi at time i. So, we can obtain the optimal control path for a given
x0. If this procedure is repeated over all the possible initial states x0 ∈ S,
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we will obtain the functions V oi (·) and π(·) by using an iteration procedure
for either the value function or the policy function.
1.2. Continuous dynamic programming and the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. In its beginnings, the dynamic programming princi-
ple was formulated in discrete-time. Further work carried this principle to
continuous time, where the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is the anal-
ogous continuous-time formulation of the discrete-time Bellman equation.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which can be considered as
an extension and a combination of the work done in classical physics on
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and Bellman’s work on discrete-time dynamic
programming, is a partial differential equation whose solution is the value
function introduced in the last subsection.
Consider the following continuous-time cost function:
V (t = 0, x0, {ut}) =
∫ T
0
e−αtC(xt, ut)dt + e
−αTD(xT )
We need to minimize V (t, x0), subject to the differential equation
dx
dt
= f(xt, ut).
Notice that this differential equation is analogous to the difference equation
from the last subsection. Suppose that u∗ is the optimal control path. Then,
V (t, x) = V (t, x, {u∗}) is the continuous-time counterpart of V oi (x), and it is
also the solution of the HJB equation. Assuming that the value function is
everywhere continuous and differentiable with respect to t and x, the HJB
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equation can be written in the following form:
minu∈U{C(x, u) +
δV (t, x)
δt
+
δV (t, x)
δx
f(x, u)}
In order to understand the derivation of the HJB equation from the
discrete-time Bellman equation, the following argument is provided. The
argument does not prove all the technical details of this derivation; it just
sketches the reasoning of the derivation. Suppose that the horizon [0, T ] is
partitioned in N parts of length δ each. Then, V (T, x) is approximated by
Ṽ (Nδ, x). Then, Ṽ (kδ, x) = minu{δC(x, u)+ Ṽ ((k+1)δ, x+δf(x, u))}. The
Taylor series expansion for a certain function g(x, y) is:
g(x + ∆x, y + ∆y) =
∞
∑
i=0
{
1
i!
[∆x
dg
dx
+ ∆y
dg
dy
]ig(x, y)}
Therefore,
Ṽ ((k+1)δ, x+δf(x, u)) = Ṽ ((kδ+δ, x+δf(x, u)) =
∞
∑
i=0
{
1
i!
[δ
dṼ
dt
+δf(x, u)
dṼ
dx
]iṼ (kδ, x)}
This infinite sum can be written as:
Ṽ ((kδ + δ, x+ δf(x, u)) = Ṽ (kδ, x)+ δ
dṼ (kδ, x)
dt
+ δf(x, u)
dṼ (kδ, x)
dx
+O(δ)
But, we also know that:
Ṽ (kδ, x) = minu{δC(x, u) + Ṽ ((k + 1)δ, x + δf(x, u))}
Therefore,
Ṽ (kδ, x) = minu{δC(x, u)+Ṽ (kδ, x)+δ
dṼ (kδ, x)
dt
+δf(x, u)
dṼ (kδ, x)
dx
+O(δ)}
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Substracting Ṽ (kδ, x) from both sides and dividing both sides by δ, we get:
0 = minu{C(x, u) +
dṼ (kδ, x)
dt
+ f(x, u)
dṼ (kδ, x)
dx
+ O(δ)}
As δ → 0 and k → ∞ such that kδ = T , assume that
lim
δ→0
k→∞
kδ=T
Ṽ (kδ, x) = V (t, x).
From this assumption and the previous result, we obtain the HJB equation:
0 = minu{C(x, u) +
V (t, x)
dt
+ f(x, u)
V (t, x)
dx
+ O(δ)}
It is generally very hard to obtain solutions for this partial differential
equation. Nevertheless, the HJB equations is a necessary and sufficient
condition for optimality, therefore in case a solution is found, it is guaranteed
that that solution for the value function will yield the minimizing policy.
Secondly, solutions of the HJB equation are usually nonsmooth functions, i.e.
value functions that are not differentiable everywhere. The previous proof
was constructed upon the assumption that the value function is differentiable
everywhere, therefore a lot of work has been done in order to circumvent
this difficulty. The concept of viscosity solutions to the HJB equation has
been introduced as a remedy. A dicussion of viscosity solutions is beyond
the scope of this chapter, but a complete treatment of this topic can be
found in Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (1997).
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2. Concepts in optimal control theory
Optimal control theory arose out of the inability of the calculus of vari-
ations, the classical method in dynamic optimization, to deal with corner
solutions, not-everywhere-differentiable state trajectories, and constraints
in the control variable. The admissible control trajectories in optimal con-
trol theory are required to be only piecewise continuous, not necessarily
everywhere continuous. The corresponding state trajectory of a piecewise
continuous control trajectory will be differentiable everywhere except for
the points where the control trajectory is discontinuous. Therefore, optimal
control theory is well-equipped to solve problems with discontinuous opti-
mal control paths. A second convenient feature of optimal control theory –
as Chiang (2005, 161-164) notes in his introduction of optimal control the-
ory – is its ability to handle optimization problems with control constraints,
which might, for instance, be in the form of a bounded and closed control
space (such as an interval in the case of a scalar control variable). These
two features of optimal control theory are very important to our analysis
because they allow this method to identify bang-bang solutions: piecewise
continuous solutions where each of the continuous pieces takes a value from
the boundary of the control space.
The basic problem of optimal control theory can be written in the fol-
lowing form:
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(2.1)
max
{γt}
∫ T
0
U(t, x, u)dt
subject to
dx
dt
= f(x, t, u),
with x(0) = a, x(T ) free; a, T given
and u ∈ U for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In the above problem, U and f are continuous in all their arguments
and have first-order partial derivatives with respect to x and t, but not
necessarily with respect to u. (Chiang, 165) Also, the problem is written in
the form of a maximization problem, but it can be easily transformed into a
minimization problem by considering the negative of the momentary utility
−U(t, x, u) as the integrand in the first line of the problem. In this way, the
problem is transformed from a problem of maximization of rewards into a
problem of minimization of costs.
2.1. The Maximum Principle: Basic notions. The most useful re-
sult of optimal control theory is Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, developed
in the early 1960s independently by both L. S. Pontryagin and his collabo-
rators in former USSR2, and M. Hestenes in the United States3 . In order
2Boltyanskii V.G., R.V. Gamkrelidze. L.S. Pontryagin: “Towards a theory of optimal
processes”, (Russian), Reports Acad. Sci. USSR Vol. 110(1), 1956
3Hestenes, M. R., “A General Problem in the Calculus of Variations with Applications
to Paths of Least Time,” Rand Corporation RM-100, ASTIA Document No. AD 112382,
Santa Monica, California: 1950.
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to introduce the Maximum Principle, the concepts of Hamiltonian function
and costate variable need to be explained first. After presenting the math-
ematical form of the Maximum Principle, an economic digression follows,
which provides the reader with a brief chart of the economic significance of
this principle.
Keeping the same notation throughout this section, the Hamiltonian
function is defined as:
H(t, x, u, λ) = U(t, x, u) + λ(t)f(x, t, u).
The costate variable in the system, λ, can be viewed as the continuous-time
analogue of a Langrange multiplier, and it is a function of time t. So, we can
talk about a costate path: the evolution of the costate variable over time.
The conditions of the maximum principle are the following:
(2.2)
max
u
H(t, x, u, λ) for all t ∈ [0, T ]
x′ =
δH
δλ
,
λ′ = −
δH
δx
λ(T ) = 0.
The second line is the equation of motion for the state variable x (which
is f(x, t, u)), expressed as a partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with re-
spect to the costate variable. The third line is an equation of motion for
the costate variable. The fourth line represents the transversality condition:
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the condition that the costate variable needs to meet at the end of the time
horizon.
While we need to find u∗ that maximizes the Hamiltonian function, that
is not necessarily equivalent with the condition δHδu = 0. That is because
the Hamiltonian function is not necessarily everywhere differentiable with
respect to u, and even when it is, the first-order condition δHδu = 0 might
identify a minimum instead of the desired maximum. In such a case, the
maximum has to be searched at the boundaries of the control space. Another
pathological case would be the case when the Hamiltonian is linear in u. If
the control set is a closed set, then the optimal solution might be a corner
solution.
Lastly, the following chart will provide a mapping of the concepts of the
maximum principle into a classical economic example from capital theory.
The chart is based on the discussion of Robert Dorfman in his-well known
article “An Economic Intepretation of Optimal Control Theory”.4 In Dorf-
man’s discussion, the basic problem is the decision problem of a firm that
aims to maximize profits over a time horizon under the capital constraints
it faces. In every moment, the firm has a capital stock that needs to be
managed. The decisions of the firm (that can vary greatly, from decisions
4Dorfman, Robert. “An Economic Intepretation of Optimal Control Theory.” Amer-
ican Economic Review. December 1969: 817-31.
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concerning the rate and price of the output to decisions concerning the de-
sign of the product) affect the rate at which the size of this capital stock is
changing.
Concept in Maximum Principle Economic Significance
state variable x amount of capital
control variable u rate of change of capital
costate variable λ shadow price of capital
λ(0) shadow price of a unit of initial capital
λ(T ) shadow price of a unit of terminal capital
function U current profit
λ(t)f(x, u, t) future profit effect of policy u
Hamiltonian function H overall profit prospect: (current profit) +
(shadow price) · (change in capital correspond-
ing to policy u)
f(x, u, t) = x′ rate of change of capital per unit of time due
to the present amount of capital, policy u, and
moment t
λ′ rate of decrease of shadow price per unit of time
(depreciation of shadow price)
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x′ = δHδλ the way the policy decision affects the rate of
change of capital: the change in capital is equal
to the contribution of the shadow price to overall
profits.
λ′ = −δHδx shadow price depreciates at the rate at which
capital contributes to overall profits.
λ(T ) = 0 shadow price is driven down to zero at the end
of the time interval, i.e. the left-over capital has
no economic value to the firm.
Alternative transversality condi-
tion: λ(T ) > 0 and (x(T ) −
xmin)λ(T ) = 0
The shadow price is not driven down to zero
(the firm intends to continue its existence be-
yond the optimizing horizon), but the terminal
capital should be xmin.
3. Green’s Theorem and the extremization of line integrals
This discussion of the application of Green’s Theorem to the extrem-
ization of line integrals will be based on the Pierre’s treatment of this
topic (Pierre 1986). Consider two real-valued functions of the form: V1 ≡
V1(x, s, t) and V2 ≡ V2(x, s, t). Let s be an explicit function of x and t.
Then, we need to extremize the quantity:
∆ = Ja + Jb =
∫
a
(V1
dx
dt
+ V2)dt +
∫
b
(V1
dx
dt
+ V2)dt
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Figure 2.1. Paths and region of integration [Graph from
Pierre 1969, 116]
Consider Rab to be the region enclosed by the paths a and b, and also consider
V1, V2, and s to be analytic functions on a and b. Then, the previous line
integral can be written as the following surface integral:
∆ =
∫∫
R
(
dV2
dx
+
dV2
ds
ds
dx
−
dV1
dt
−
dV1
ds
ds
dt
)dxdt
The paths over which we are integrating are showed in the following picture:
The sign of the double integral is dependent on the direction of the paths
a and b; if a and b would have opposite directions from what is shown in
the graph, then the double integral would be of negative sign. The sign of
the integrand of the surface integral determines the value of x that mini-
mizes/maximizes the initial line integral. If the integrand is positive above
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the path a, negative below it, and zero along it, then Ja is the maximum
value of J. On the contrary, if the integrand is negative above the path a,
positive above it, and zero along it, then the path a is a minimizing path of
J.
4. The curious case of singular optimal control problems
A singular minimizing control path for the general optimal control prob-
lem is defined as one for which the classical Legendre-Clebsch condition is
not satisfied with strict inequality (Bell and Jacobson 1975). Therefore,
along a singular control path, there is nothing we can say about the convex-
ity of the Hamiltonian function with respect to the control variable. Goh
(Goh 1966, Bell and Jacobson 1975) was the first to establish that the ex-
tremal trajectory is singular for the case in which the Hamiltonian H is
linear in one or more elements of the control function u(t).
Definition. Consider ui to be an optimal singular element of the con-
trol vector u on [t1, t2] which appears linearly in H . Suppose that ui appears
explicitly in H after taking the time derivative of δHδui 2k times. Then, the
integer k is called the order of the singular control path.
Definition. Assuming that all the components of the control vector u
are simultaneously singular, then u is called a totally singular control path
if
δH(x̄,λ,t)
δu = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The control path is partially singular if
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δH(x̄,λ,t)
δu = 0 holds for k intervals, whose sum of lengths is less than the
total length of the optimizing horizon.
After having introduced these general concepts involved in singular op-
timal control problems, we turn to a brief discussion of singular solutions of
autonomous (time-independent) optimization problems with nonlinear dy-
namic systems and linear utility function.
Suppose that the control variable u is a scalar. Let x′ = f(x) + g(x)u
and U(x, u) = ax + bu. Then, the Hamiltonian function is:
H = ax + bu + λ(f(x) + g(x)u) = ax + λf(x) + u(b + λg(x)).
Taking the derivative of H with respect to u, we obtain:
δH
δu
= b + λg(x).
W = b + λg(x) is called a switching function. This switching function does
not directly determine a stationary control, because it does not depend on
u. Nevertheless, we can find u(t) over a finite interval so that the switching
function is zero over that interval. In order to do so, we need to take time
derivatives of the switching function, and set them equal to zero.
The first time derivative of W does not depend on u. Given that the
coefficient before u in the second time derivative will not be zero, we can
determine an expression for the stationary solution u∗. In order to check
the optimality of this singular control, we introduce the following necessary
condition.
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4.1. Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition. A necessary condi-
tion for minimality is the usual convexity condition (second-order condition):
δ
δu
(
δH
δu
) ≥ 0 (Classical Legendre-Clebsch condition)
In the case of a singular control, this condition is satisfied trivially, because
δ
δu(
δH
δu ) = 0. For this case, we turn to another more well-suited condition,
that looks much like the convexity condition above. The two version of the
condition are the following:
Condition for minimality (Bryson and Ho 1969, Bell and Jacobson 1975):
(−1)k
δ
δu
[
(
δ
δt
)2k
δH
δu
]
≥ 0
Condition for maximality (Sethi and Thompson 1981):
(−1)k
δ
δu
[
(
δ
δt
)2k
δH
δu
]
≤ 0
This condition is known as the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition (al-
ternatively, Kelley-Contensou test). The proof of this inequality for the case
when k = 1 uses second variation of the utility function.
According to Bryson and Ho (Bryson and Ho 1969, 258-261), these fol-
lowing facts always hold:
(i) The variable 2k is always even. A problem is a singular problem of order
2k if the following hold:
(
d
dt
)i
δH
δu
= 0 for all i = 0, 1, ..., (2k− 1)
and (
d
dt
)2k
δH
δu
= a(x, λ) + b(x, λ)u
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(ii) The singular surface in the (x, λ)-space is of dimension (2n−2k), where
n is the dimension of the state vector x and 2k is the order of the singular
problem.
4.2. Chattering. Zelikin and Borisov (Borisov and Zelikin, 1994) have
studied problems the optimal solutions of which are not piecewise continu-
ous, but merely measurable: these optimal controls have an infinite number
of discontinuous jumps over a finite time horizon. This behavior is known as
chattering. Chattering does not allow for a direct use of Pontryagin’s maxi-
mum principle due to the fact that it is not considered an admissible policy
as it is not piecewise continuous, i.e. there does not exist a non-zero-length
time interval with a continuous control.
5. Current-value Hamiltonian function
Continuing the discussion started in the second section of this chapter,
this section present a revised version of the Maximum Principle. Suppose
that the utility function is of the form: U(t, x, u) = V (t, x, u)e−αt. Then,
we need to revise the conditions of the Maximum Principle to account for
this change in the utility function. The Hamiltonian function will be:
H(t, x, u, λ) = V (t, x, u)e−αt + λf(t, x, u)
so we define the current-value Hamiltonian function to be:
Hc(t, x, u, λ) = V (t, x, u) + λe
αtf(t, x, u).
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Letting µ = λeαt, we rewrite the current-value Hamiltonian function as:
Hc(t, x, u, λ) = V (t, x, u) + µf(t, x, u).
Notice that:
x′ =
δH
δλ
= f(t, x, u) =
δHc
δµ
Also,
λ′ = −
δH
δx
= µ′e−αt − αµe−αt
But,
H = Hce
−αt ⇒ −
δH
δx
= −
δHc
δx
e−αt
So,
−
δHc
δx
e−αt = µ′e−αt − αµe−αt
µ′ = −
δH
δx
+ αµ
Therefore, the conditions for the revised Maximum Principle are the
following:
(2.3)
max
u
Hc(t, x, u, λ) for all t ∈ [0, T ]
x′ =
δHc
δµ
,
µ′ = −
δH
δx
+ αµ
µ(T )e−αT = 0.
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6. Euler’s method of approximation
Euler’s method of approximation is a linear one-step approximation
method that will be useful later on when we will need to discretize the
differential equation of the continuous-time problem. In this section, we
first present the method, and then offer a discussion of the magnitude and
the bounds of the error from the approximation. Lastly, we will prove that
as the step used in the approximation decreases, the approximation becomes
more accurate.
Consider the differential equation: y′(t) = f(t, x(t)) with initial con-
dition x(t0) = x0. Then, by choosing a time step h, the discrete form of
this equation becomes xn+1 = xn + hf(tn, xn), or alternatively, x(t0 + h) =
x(t0) + hf(t0, x(t0)). The magnitude of the error produced by this approx-
imation method can be found by comparing this first-order approximation
to the Taylor expansion of x(t0 + h).
Euler’s method: x(t0 + h) = x(t0) + hf(t0, x(t0))
Taylor’s expansion: x(t0 + h) = x(t0) + hx
′(t0) +
1
2
h2x′′(t0) + O(h
3)
We know that:
x′′(t0) =
df(t0, x(t0))
dt
+
df(t0, x(t0))
dx
f(t0, x(t0))
Hence, Taylor’s expansion can be rewritten as:
x(t0+h) = x(t0)+hx
′(t0)+
1
2
h2
[
df(t0, x(t0))
dt
+
df(t0, x(t0))
dx
f(t0, x(t0))
]
+O(h3)
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Therefore, the error that Euler’s approximation yields is:
1
2
h2
[
df(t0, x(t0))
dt
+
df(t0, x(t0))
dx
f(t0, x(t0))
]
+ O(h3).
As h → 0, this error approaches zero.
The error bounds are determined by the following inequality:
|εn+1| ≤
hM
2L
(eL(t−t0) − 1)
where ε is the error, h is the step size, M is an upper bound on |x′′| for all
t in the considered time interval, and L is the Lipschitz constant for f .
7. The logistic nature of the SIS dynamic equation
In this section, I will give a short description of the logistic form and the
solutions of the following differential equation:
x′ = βx(N − x) − γx = f(x, u).
The classical logistic function is of the form:f(x) = ax(1 − xK ), where K is
referred to as the carrying capacity, or saturation level.
As it can be easily seen, the first part of our differential equation is of
such a form: βx(N − x) = βNx(1 − xN ). Akin to the analysis of a similar
harvesting model (Gordon-Schaefer fishing model) by Clarke (Clarke 1976),
we can write the differential equation as:
x′ = βNx(1−
x
N
)− γx.
7. THE LOGISTIC NATURE OF THE SIS DYNAMIC EQUATION 42
To obtain the equilibria of this equation, we set x′ = 0. For any γ < βN ,
the equilibria is x = 0 and x = K(1 − γβ ). It can be shown that the second
equilibrium (the nontrivial equilibrium) is asymptotically stable.
7.1. Solutions to the SIS differential equation. We are given the
homogeneous quadratic differential equation of the form
dx
dt
= βx(N − x) − γx
and we need to find a closed form solution for x(t). By separating the
variables t and x, we get:
dx
x(βN − γ − βx)
= dt
Then, integrating both sides:
∫
1
x(βN − γ − βx)
dx =
∫
dt
By the method of partial fractions, we find that:
1
x(βN − γ − βx)
=
1
(βN − γ)x
+
β
(βN − γ)(βN − γ − βx
Therefore, the left-hand-side integral can be written as:
1
βN − γ
∫
(
1
x
+
β
βN − γ − βx
)dx =
1
βN − γ
(ln |x| − ln |βN − γ − βx|) =
=
1
βN − γ
ln |
x
βN − γ − βx
|
The integral of the right-hand-side is:
∫
dt = t + k
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Therefore,
1
βN − γ
ln |
x
βN − γ − βx
| = t + k
(βN − γ)(t + k) = ln |
x
βN − γ − βx
|
x
βN − γ − βx
= ±e(βN−γ)(t+k) = Aet(βN−γ)
where A = ±ek(βN−γ). Then, by isolating the terms that contain x in them
(note that x is used instead of x(t) out of convenience), we get:
x(t) =
(βN − γ)Aet(βN−γ)
1 + βAet(βN−γ)
By multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of x(t) by e−(t+k)(βN−γ),
we get:
x(t) =
βN − γ
β + Ae−t(βN−γ)
Letting C1 =
A
βN−γ , we rearrange the denominator and get a solution of the
form:
x(t) =
βN − γ
β + C1(βN − γ)e−t(βN−γ)
8. Discretization of the discounting factor
This last section briefly clarifies the discrete-time formulation of the
exponential discounting factor used in continuous time. Suppose that we
are looking at time t = T ; the immediate costs incurred at that time are
discounted by a factor e−αT back to the present t = 0. Suppose that we
partition this time horizon [0, T ] into equal intervals of length δ. Then, we
will have Tw such intervals. Consider each of these intervals as one time
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period in the discretized problem. What is the appropriate discount factor
in this discrete-time framework?
If w = 1, then [0, T ] will be divided into T time periods, and the discount
factor will be of the form: a = 11+α . In the general case when w is not
normalized to a length of 1, a = 11+wα . In order to see how is this discrete-
time discount factor an approximation of the continuous-time exponential
discount factor, we consider the limiting case when w → 0. Viewed from
time t = 0, the momentary costs of the last period T/w are discounted by a
factor of ( 11+wα )
T/w. But, as the length of each period approaches zero, we
know that
lim
w→0
(
1
1 + wα
)T/w = e−αT .
Therefore, the appropriate discrete-time discount factor corresponding to
e−αt is ( 11+wα)
t/w.
CHAPTER 3
Essay One:
Attempting to reconcile a classical debate
“It is, in a sense, the single most effective way for the system to grow,
so that if we are planning long-run growth, no matter where we start, and
where we desire to end up, it will pay in the intermediate stages to get into a
growth phase of this kind. It is exactly like a turnpike paralleled by a network
of minor roads. There is a fastest route between any two points; and if the
origin and destination are close together and far from the turnpike, the best
route may not touch the turnpike. But if origin and destination are far
enough apart, it will always pay to get on to the turnpike and cover distance
at the best rate of travel, even if this means adding a little mileage at either
end.”
Robert Dorfman, Paul Samuelson, and Robert Solow
“Is the fate of calculus tied to infinitesimals, or must it not be given a
rigorous status from the point of view of finite representations? It is precisely
this alternative between infinite and finite representation that is at issue
when we speak of the ’metaphysics’ of calculus.”
Gilles Deleuze
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This chapter delves into the investigation of potential sources of the
discrepancies between the discrete-time and the continuous-time solutions
offered by Sanders (Sanders 1971) and Sethi (Sethi 1974) respectively. Ex-
tending the discussion begun in the first chapter with the brief description of
the argument of each of the articles, the first section of this chapter provides
further details on the methods employed by the articles and on a recent at-
tempt of Anderson and Salant to shed light on this controversy. The work
of Anderson and Salant opens several research paths that are undertaken
and explored in the second and the third section. Section 4 provides a re-
evaluation of Sanders’ argument by extending the argument to a discrete
model with length of period w. The fifth section reconsiders the optimality
of the singular solution offered by Sethi by checking whether the General-
ized Legendre-Clebsch condition holds for this case. Section 6 concludes the
chapter.
1. Expository discussion
Sanders, being the first one to start this scholarly conversation, set up a
discrete-time model of an infectious disease with costs that depend linearly
in the size of the infected population and in the effort chosen to treat the
disease. His model was one of the earliest attempts that preceded the emer-
gence of an entire area of economics of infectious diseases. Therefore, the
choice of the SIS model was reasonable because of its simplicity: the popula-
tion size is fixed and the population consists of only susceptible and infected
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individuals. Furthermore, in order to keep things simple, he excluded the
possibility of random recoveries from the dynamics of the disease; hence,
the only two factors affecting the spread of the infection are the interactions
between susceptible and infected individuals, and the treatment policy un-
dertaken by a health agent. The treatment effort, expressed as a portion of
the infected individuals chosen to be “removed” of the infected subpopula-
tion, has constant marginal cost and an upper bound due to technological
limitations. So, while Sanders was aiming to set up a simple model of infec-
tious diseases, he managed to include three very problematic features in his
model, – features that, as it will become apparent later on, account for the
atypical solution structure in discrete and continuous time: (i) linear costs,
(ii) nonlinear motion law, and (iii) bounded control.
Equation (1.1) presents the discrete-time optimization problem in math-
ematical form. The corresponding value function equation is the following:
Vn(x) = min{Cx + Kγ + αVn−1(x + βx(N − x)− γx)}
In the way in which Sanders sets up the problem, there are two facts worth
noticing: 1) his interpretation of the upper bound on γ and 2) his general-
ization of the difference equation for a period of length ∆. As mentioned
earlier as well, the treatment parameter γ takes values on an interval [0, b].
Sanders interprets b as the treatment success rate, or alternatively, as 1−T
where T is the treatment failure rate. This formulation implicitly suggests
that b cannot be greater than 1, hence γ takes values between 0 and (at
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most) 1. So, the structure of the optimal policy proposed by Sanders cru-
cially depends on the fact that γ can be at most 1. The question of how
does the maximum value of b – and more fundamentally, the nature and
the interpretation of b – change when going from a discrete-time framework
to a continuous-time framework is of particular importance in our analy-
sis. Secondly, Sanders generalizes the first-order difference equation for the
infection level in the following form:
x(t + ∆t) = x + β∆tx(N − x) − γx.
While he does not make direct use of this formulation in his article, as he
normalizes ∆t = 1, this discrete-time formulation is troublesome because it
does not capture the size of the effect of a treatment policy γ for periods
of different lengths. In other words, according to this formulation, a certain
treatment level, say γ∗, has the same impact γ∗x (where x is the infection
level at the beginning of the period) for both a time period of length ∆t = 0.5
and ∆t = 100.
The major theorem of the article states that: a) the value function is a
monotone increasing function with respect to x, b) it has non-positive second
derivatives with respect to γ and negative second derivatives with respect to
x, and 3) the optimal policy is γ∗ = 0 or b. From this theorem, several results
are concluded: 1) the strict concavity of the value function with respect to x
shows that the optimal policy is either 0 or b, so it is never at an intermediate
level between 0 and b, 2) for a given infection level x∗, if γ∗n(x
∗) = 0 for a
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certain n, then for any n′ < n, γ∗n′(x
∗) = 0; if γ∗n(x
∗) = b for a certain n,
then for any n′ > n, γ∗n′(x
∗) = b, 3) the health agent never treats anybody
if Kb − [ α1−α ]CN < 0, 4) for infinitely long planning horizons (i.e n → ∞),
in any period n provided that α(1 + βn) < 1 (i.e n is not too far ahead in
the future), γ∗ = 0 if Kb− αCbx1−α(1+βn) > 0 and γ
∗ = b if Kb− αCbx1−α(1−βn) < 0.
The third result raises the question: what is the optimal policy if x is such
that Kb − αCbx1−α(1+βn) < 0 and Kb −
αCbx
1−α(1−βn) > 0? The previous results
establish that the optimal policy is always in the boundary of the control
range, so although we do not exactly know if γ∗ = 0 or γ∗ = b for such x,
we do know that it will always be extremal. The main proof that Sanders
provides will be revisited in the fourth section, when I attempt to extend it
for periods of length w instead of of unit length.
Sethi transferred Sanders’ model to continuous-time, in the form of the
optimization problem presented in Equation (1.2). Unlike in Sanders’ work,
this article places no restrictions on the value that b can take. Formally
speaking, in the case when b is infinite, the control appears to be an impulse
control: the agent is able to treat every one in a single instant. This distinc-
tion might be rooted in the way in which we think about “action” in discrete
and continuous time. The upper bound on the upper bound is crucial to
the solutions of the problem. The size of the upper bound b is reflected in
the turnpike solutions that Sethi identifies: if b is not large enough, then the
turnpike will not be achieved, therefore the optimal policy will be a strictly
bang-bang solution.
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Because of the linear nature of the costs and the linear dependence of
the change in x on the control, the Hamiltonian function in Sethi’s problem
will be linear in the control:
H = −(Cx+Kγ)+λ[βx(N −x)−γx] = −Cx+λβx(N −x)+ (−K −λx)γ
When the coefficient before the control term in the Hamiltonian function is
not zero, the optimal control will be either 0 or b, depending on the sign
of that coefficient. But, in the case when this coefficient is equal to zero,
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle fails to provide us with an optimal control
due to the fact that the second derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to
the control is zero as well. The optimal control for this case should be found
by other methods, and its optimality needs to be proven. As a reminder, in
the second chapter we introduced the notion of singular controls, which may
be either partially singular or totally singular, depending on whether they
are optimal over the entire horizon or only several intervals of that horizon.
Referring back to one of the earliest articles on the study of the existence
of singular controls (Johnson 1963), the authors note that the solution for
the type of problem when the Hamiltonian is linear in the control can be of
several forms: bang-bang (piecewise-continuous control where every “piece”
takes values in the boundary of the control set), chattering (the control is
not even piecewise-continuous, only measurable, in which case the control
switches infinitely many times within a finite horizon), totally singular, or
any finite concatenation of each of these. Hence, unlike Sethi’s statement
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that “the maximum principle immediately yields the form of the optimal
control” (Sethi 1974, 682), the form of the optimal control should be con-
firmed by tools other than the maximum principle, some of which Sethi uses
in his article.
As both the control variable and the state variable are scalars, Miele’s
method of extremization of line integrals, which is based on an application
of Green’s theorem, can be employed to find the expression for the singular
(or steady-state) control (Miele 1961) . The same control can be identified
by taking the time derivatives of the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian
function with respect to γ; this argument will be explored in greater detail in
Section 5. Sethi uses such an application of Green’s theorem to identify an
expression for the singular control, and then he employs a switching-point
analysis to identify the complete structure of the optimal control, which is
a so-called bang-singular-bang (or bang-off-bang) structure. The solution,
hence, turns into totally singular only if x0 = x
s and the the problem is
free-end-point or the fixed end point is xf = x
s, while it turns into strictly
bang-bang if the upper bound on control is sufficiently small and/or the
optimizing horizon is sufficiently short.
The most recent contribution that attempts to advance the debate be-
tween Sanders and Sethi is a paper by Anderson and Salant titled “Hunting
Bacteria” (Anderson and Salant, 2011). Anderson and Salant consider the
discrete-time problem introduced by Sanders and check the optimality of
the turnpike solution identified by Sethi in discrete time. They do so by
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assuming that when the level of the infection is at the turnpike level xs, a
small perturbation ±h from the steady-state policy γs should increase the
costs of the program as γs is the optimal policy. They first find an ex-
pression for xs = rKC−Kβ and γ
s = β(N − xs) which are the discrete-time
counterparts of Sethi’s xs and γs (r is the discrete-time counterpart of the
continuous time discount rate α). Then, the authors suggest a single per-
turbation γs +h at period t, where t is assumed to correspond to a moment
at which the singular solution is optimal in continuous time. This perturba-
tion will result in an infection level xt+1 in the next time period (t + 1), so
the infection level will move away from the steady-state level. Further, they
assume that at period (t + 1), we apply a correct policy γt+1 that would
bring the infection level at period (t + 2) back to xs. Then, Anderson and
Salant show that the two-period costs for this perturbation are lower than
the costs of applying Sethi’s policy γs. In addition, they prove that the cost
function is strictly concave in the neighborhood around h = 0. This means
that any policy that deviates by h from the steady-state solution performs
better than the steady-state policy. Therefore, they conclude that in this
discrete-time framework, Sethi might have mistaken a local maximum for
a global minimum, as any perturbation around h = 0 produces lower costs
than the case of h = 0. This is an important result as it shows the non-
optimality of the steady-state control proposed by Sethi in the discrete time
framework. Nevertheless, this analysis does not bridge the gap between the
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discrete-time framework and the continuous-time framework; it rather rein-
forces the discrepancies between these two frameworks. Secondly, one might
wonder whether the discrete-time steady-state solution that is analogous to
the one that Sethi identifies in continuous time is the only candidate for
being the supposedly optimal singular solution. The intuitive similarity be-
tween discrete-time and continuous-time optimal policies is not the (only)
ground for this statement. In fact, Anderson and Salant prove that if there
exists a steady-state solution in discrete-time, that solution will be of a sim-
ilar form to the one that Sethi identifies in continuous time (Anderson and
Salant 2011, 2).
These three articles have guided the work that will be presented in the
following sections. The questions that we have attempted to answer while
examining these articles have been basically two: (i) are there any faulty
assumptions, mistakes in the optimization techniques, and/or misinterpre-
tations of results in the analysis of each of these papers, and (2) is there a
way to extend the analysis started by Anderson and Salant in continuous
time. Finally, throughout the analysis presented in the following sections,
we have kept in mind the complexities – both known and unknown to us,–
that arise when moving from one time scale to another. Indeed, if there is
one thing that this analysis has made us quite aware of, that is the enormous
variety of such complexities. In this spirit, Jacobson and Mayne (1970) note
the following when attempting to apply their variation-based algorithmic
method of differential dynamic programming to discrete-time problems: “In
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one respect discrete-time systems are simpler to analyze than the continuous-
time systems,[...]– differential equations are replaced by difference equations
whose solutions are easier to compute. However discrete-time systems also
produce complications of their own. A non-infinitesimal change in the con-
trol ui at time i produces non-infinitesimal changes in the subsequent trajec-
tory. For the continuous-time system, on the other hand, a non-infinitesimal
change in the control action u(t) over the interval [t1 − ε, t1 + ε] (ε > 0 but
arbitrarily small) produces small, or order ε, variations in x(t) (t > t1).”
(Jacobson and Mayne 1970, 99).
2. Perturbation in continuous time
This section discusses two alternative approaches that we have explored
aiming to construct an argument that is structurally similar to the one
made by Anderson and Salant, but that tackles the problem in continuous
time. The first approach will extend the exercise of Anderson and Salant
by incorporating the length of the time period w as a variable in the model.
This will be achieved by looking at the difference equation in (1.1) as an
Euler approximation to the original differential equation in (1.2)1. Then, we
will attempt to observe the behavior of the h-perturbation as the length of
the time period approaches zero. Notice that this exercise slightly modifies
the framework of Anderson and Salant, and is still restricted to discrete time
1I call the differential equation “original” because the Kermack-McKendrick model
was at first formulated as a differential equation rather than a difference equation.
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only. The second approach will replicate the exercise proposed by Anderson
and Salant in continuous time, by distinguishing between two cases: 1) when
a perturbed policy γs + h is applied for an interval of length ∆t and then a
restorative policy γt+1 is applied during a second time interval of the same
length, and 2) when ∆t is approaching zero in the previous scenario. This
second approach asks in essence: if we perturb the steady-state policy for a
single instant (whatever that means mathematically), and then correct that
perturbation in the next instant (a strategy parallel to the one that Anderson
and Salant employ), would we have just lowered the costs by doing this?
2.1. Extension of “Hunting Bacteria” in discrete-time. Follow-
ing Euler’s method of approximation of differential equations, the difference
equation corresponding to dxdt = βx(N − x)− γx is:
(3.1) xt+1 = xt + w(βx(N − x) − γx)
where w denotes the length of the time period. Notice that when we let
w = 1, we return to the standard case discussed in “Hunting Bacteria”.
Based on this discrete-time dynamics, we will rewrite the expressions for xs,
γs, xt+1, and γt+1 following an argument parallel to the one made in the
“Hunting Bacteria” piece. The discrete-time cost function that accounts for
the length of the time period will be of the form:
(3.2)
T
∑
t=1
(δ(w))t(Cwxt + Kwγt)
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The discount rate δ varies for different time period lengths, therefore δ is a
function of w. For a general period length w, the discounting factor will be
of the form:
(3.3) δ =
1
1 + wr
Refer to the discussion of the discounting factor in Chapter 2 for further
details.
Using Lagrange multipliers to minimize the cost function, we let the
Lagrangian be:
L =
T
∑
t=1
(δ(w))t[(Cwxt+Kwγt)+λt(xt+wβxt(N−xt)−wγtxt−xt+1)]+λ0(x̄−x1)
An interior solution will satisfy the first-order conditions: Lγt = 0 and
Lxt = 0 for all t = 1, ..., T . Therefore, from the first-order condition with
respect to γt, we derive that:
Lγt = δ
t(Kw − wλtxt) = 0
(3.4) λt =
K
xt
The first-order condition with respect to xt is:
Lxt = δ
t[Cw + λt + λtwβN − 2λtwβxt − λtwγt] − λt−1δ
t−1 = 0
(3.5) δ(Cw +
K
xt
(1 + wβN − 2wβxt − wγt)) −
K
xt−1
= 0
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The turnpike infection level that Sethi suggests is stationary, therefore, in
order for it to be maintained from one period to another, the number of
the newly infected people should be equal to the number of the people that
were effectively treated during the last period. That means that w(βxs(N −
xs) − γsxs) = 0 ⇒ γs = β(N − xs). Also, we know that this steady state
should satisfy equations (1.8) and (1.9) derived above. Therefore,
δ(Cw +
K
xs
(1 + wβN − 2wβxs − wγs))−
K
xs
= 0
where γs = β(N − xs). Therefore, we can derive an expression for xs:
(3.6) xs =
(1− δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
Suppose that the steady-state level of treatment effort γs is perturbed
to γs + h. The infection level in the next period will be xt+1, such that:
xt+1 = x
s + wβxs(N − xs) − w(γs + h)xs
Hence,
(3.7) xt+1 = x
s(1− wh)
Starting from an infection level xt+1, we can find γt+1 that would restore
the infection level at xs in the next period. The difference equation for the
next time period is:
xs = xt+1 + w
(
βxt+1(N − xt+1) − γt+1xt+1
)
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Substituting for xt+1, we can solve for γt+1
2 :
(3.8) γt+1 =
h
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1− wh)
)
Having obtained expressions for xs, γs, xt+1, and γt+1, we can compute
the costs of this perturbation over the two time periods:
Costs = δt
[
wCxs + wK(γs + h)
]
+ δt+1
[
wCxt+1 + wKγt+1
]
Dividing by δt and simplifying the expression further, we get:
Costs =
[
wC
(1 − δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
+ wK
(
β(N − xs) + h
)
]
+
δ
[
wC
(1− δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
(1− wh) + wK
(
h
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1 − wh)
)
)]
For a fixed value of w, we could rearrange the terms by isolating all the
terms that include h in them and labeling all the other terms as constants.
Therefore, the two-period cost function is:
(3.9) Costs = constants + wK
[
h
(
1 − C
1 − δ
C − Kβ
+ βwxs
)
+
h
hw − 1
]
When we differentiate this cost function twice and we evaluate the value of
the second derivative at h = 0, we get the expression:
(3.10) wK (w (1 − 2 (1 + w)))
As the value of w approaches zero, the value of this second derivative ap-
proaches zero as well, so the concavity of the function in the neighborhood
2For further details on the computations of this subsection, please see Appendix A
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around h = 0 remains inconclusive. We are interested to know what happens
to the values of xs,γs, xt+1, γt+1 and the two-period cost function as the
length of the time periods shrinks infinitely, i.e. when w → 0. Our ultimate
goal is to be able to state whether the cost function is concave around the
neighborhood of h = 0 as w approaches 0. When the length of the time
period approaches zero, we obtain the following limits for xs,γs, xt+1, γt+1,
which are in agreement with what we would expect intuitively:
lim
w→0
xs =
Kα
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
γs = β(N −
Kα
C − Kβ
)
lim
w→0
xt+1 =
Kα
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
γt+1 = −h + βN −
Kα
C − Kβ
β
When w = 1, it is easily showed that the cost function is strictly concave
in h when h = 0. For a more general case of a time period length w, as
we showed above, the cost function becomes more complicated due to the
w factor in front of all the terms that contain h in that function. In other
words, as we let w → 0, so as we let the time period become infinitesimally
small, all the terms with h in them disappear from the expression, and we
are left with no clue on what the concavity of that cost function is around
h = 0.
While this exercise provides an elegant extension of the discrete-time
framework that Anderson and Salant have constructed, it yields no specific
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conclusions on whether the results that they find hold even when we shrink
the period length to zero. At this point, it is reasonable to conclude that any
discrete-time method that relies on this shrinking strategy in order to con-
nect to the continuous-time framework will most likely fail due to difficulties
that arise in the limit. In the next subsection, we turn to a method of car-
rying the argument made in “Hunting Bacteria” over to a continuous-time
framework. This method aims to get closer to the continuous-time terrain
in which Sethi’s work lives.
2.2. Continuous-time “Hunting Bacteria”.
2.2.1. When the length of the time interval is not approaching zero. Let’s
suppose that at time t1, the level of the infection level is at the turnpike level
xs and we choose to perturbate the treatment effort from the turnpike level
γs to (γs + h). Analogously to the reasoning in the discrete-time model,
this new level of treatment effort will affect the infection level at time t2
(t2 chosen such that t2 > t1 and t2 − t1 = ∆t). Then, we will need to
apply a treatment effort γt+1 at t2
3 in order for the infection level at time
t3 to return back to the stationary level x
s (t3 chosen such that t3 > t2 and
t3 − t2 = ∆t). During the time interval [t1, t2], the infection level changes
according to the differential equation:
(3.11) x′1 = βx(N − x) − (γ
s + h)x
3This notation is chosen in order to keep up with the discrete-time notation introduced
in Anderson and Salant.
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with initial condition x0 = x
s. Similarly, the infection level during the time
interval [t2, t3] is governed by the differential equation
(3.12) x′2 = βx(N − x)− (γt+1)x
with initial condition x0 = x(t2) (and terminal condition x(t3) = x
s). Our
goal is to calculate the cost function for the time interval [t1, t3] and examine
whether and how this cost function depends on h.
First, we evaluate the steady-state level of infection and the steady-state
treatment level:
xs =
Kα
C − Kβ
γs = β(N − xs) = β(N −
Kα
C − Kβ
)
The closed-form solutions for the differential equations mentioned above
are:
(3.13) x1(t) =
βN − γs − h
β + C1βNe−t(βN−γ
s−h) − C1(γs + h)e−t(βN−γ
s−h)
for equation (3.11) and:
(3.14) x2(t) =
βN − γt+1
β + C2βNe−t(βN−γt+1) − C2γt+1e−t(βN−γt+1)
for equation (3.12).
Notice that the initial condition for the first differential equation is x01 =
xs, while the initial condition for the second differential equation is x02 =
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xt+1. Hence, we can solve for C1 and C2 based on these initial conditions.
Using these initial conditions, we can rewrite the equations in such a form
that they include γt+1 in them; the goal is to isolate an expression for γt+1
so that we can then evaluate the costs for this perturbation and analyze
its dependence on h. After several algebraic manipulations4, we receive the
following:
(3.15) βN − xsβ = γt+1 + x
s
(
e−∆t(βN−γt+1)(C2βN − C2γt+1)
)
It is mathematically intractable to isolate γt+1 from the equation above,
as γt+1 appears in the exponential terms and in the linear terms of the
equation. This obstacle does not allow us to talk any further about the
costs of an h-perturbation over non-shrinking time intervals. At this point,
we consider the limit of equation (3.15) to overcome this difficulty, thus
turning our attention to the case of shrinking time intervals.
2.2.2. When the length of the time interval is approaching zero. Building
upon the results of part a, we take the limit of equation (3.15) as ∆t → 0:
lim
∆t→0
(β(N − xs)) = lim
∆t→0
(
γt+1 + x
s
(
e−∆t(βN−γt+1)(C2βN − C2γt+1)
))
⇓
β(N − xs) = γt+1 + x
s(C2βN − C2γt+1)
⇓
4See Appendix B for a thorough mathematical discussion of this case.
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(3.16) γt+1 =
βN − xsβ − xsC2βN
1− C2xs
At this point, we have determined the treatment level that needs to be
applied at t2 in order to return to the stationary level of infection x
s. The
cost function for the interval [t1, t3] can be written as a sum of costs of the
intervals [t1, t2] and [t2, t3]. Hence, the total costs for [t1, t3] are:
(3.17)
∫ 0
∆t
δt1+∆t
(
Cx1(t)+ K(γ
s + h)
)
+
∫ 0
∆t
δt1+∆t+∆t
(
Cx2(t) + K(γt+1)
)
We are interested to evaluate this expression at ∆t → 0.
Two difficulties that can be noticed this point of our analysis make
the approach of alternating between γs + h and γt+1 not very promising
for further results. First, each of the cost integrals cannot be evaluated
analytically, so there is no analytical way to compute the antiderivative of
the integral. As this problem arises because of the form of the cost function,
we expect such a difficulty to arise repeatedly in similar attempts. The
second obstacle, which is closely tied to the first one, arises out of the fact
that if we attempt to take the limit of the integrals in equation (3.16) without
finding an antiderivative expression first, then based on the Fundamental
Theorem of Calculus, the sum of integrals goes to zero. This is equivalent
to the fact that the instantaneous costs are zero.
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3. Green’s theorem and the Legendre-Clebsch condition
Before introducing the results of this exercise, it would be worthwhile to
point out two important features of the optimization technique that is based
on Green’s theorem and quickly clarify how do the solutions identified by
Sethi using this technique look graphically. First, this technique – although
quite limited in its applicability due to the requirement that both the state
variable and the control variable ought to be scalars – provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for minimality (Leitmann 1967, 64). Secondly, this
approach identifies global, rather than just local, optimal solutions (Pontani
and Teoffilato 2009, 3). These two features, combined together, assure us
that the singular control that Sethi identifies through this technique is indeed
globally optimal. Lastly, as we stated in the introduction of this technique in
the second chapter, the sign of the integrand inside the double integral is very
important when analyzing whether the identified extremum is a maximum
or a minimum. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 below show graphically how the sign of
the integrand Kαx − C + Kβ changes as shown (both cases of x
s < 0 and
xs > 0, where xs is the singular state path graphed in the plane (t, x)-plane,
are considered).
This section reconsiders the results obtained by Sethi through the ap-
plication of Green’s theorem by taking the approach of finding the time
derivatives of the switching function. The same expression for the singu-
lar control path and the singular state path are obtained, but we go one
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Figure 3.1. The sign of the integrand when xs > 0
Figure 3.2. The sign of the integrand when xs < 0
step further and check whether the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition
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holds along the singular control.5 The results confirm the optimality of the
singular control.
In the optimal control problem formulated by Sethi, the objective func-
tion is linear in the control variable, the differential equation governing the
changes in the infection level is nonlinear in the control, and there are in-
equality constraints in both the state variable and the control variable. This
specific class of optimal control problems is best handled by finding an ex-
pression for the switching manifold, and then determining the behavior of
the optimal path when approaching this manifold. This behavior is deter-
mined by the form of the switching function and its higher derivatives. If
all its derivatives vanish at a certain time t, then the system has an optimal
control of a singular form. Otherwise, the control has just a switch at time
t, which means that the value of the control changes from one bound of the
control to the other, while the switching function changes sign. Sethi makes
use of the switching-point analysis in finding that a three-piece concatena-
tion of the singular control and the bang-bang control is optimal, while he
does not employ this analysis in identifying the singular control.
5The work of Ledzewicz and Schättler (2002), which contains a successful implemen-
tation of the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition to confirm the nonoptimality of the
singular control in a model of cancer chemotherapy, inspired us to take a switching func-
tion analysis and apply the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition to Sethi’s problem.
Later on, the need for a deeper technical understanding of this type of analysis guided us
to classical sources such as Bryson and Ho (1969), Bell and Jacobson (1975) etc.
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In order to identify a singular control, one needs to take time derivatives
of the switching function and set them to zero until the control variable
reappears in the derivative, and then solve for that control variable; the
obtained expression will be the singular control (Borisov and Zelikin 1994,
Bryson and Ho 1975). Then, one needs to check whether this singular control
satisfies the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition (alternatively known as
Kelley’s condition) in order to determine whether this singular control path
is optimal. These are the steps that I will follow in the rest of this exercise.
Let the Hamiltonian function be:
H = −(Cx+Kγ)+λ[βx(N −x)−γx] = −Cx+λβx(N −x)+γ(−K −λx)
We also know that:
λ′ = λ(α − βN + γ) + 2βxλ + C
So, the switching function is:
dH
dt
= W (t) = −K − λ(t)x(t)
Setting it to zero,
λx = −K
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Taking the first derivative of W (t) with respect to t,6
W ′(t) = −Cx − λβx2 − λαx = −Cx + Kβx + Kα = 0
Solving for xs,
xs =
Kα
C − Kβ
The control variable does not appear in the first derivative of the switching
function, so we need to evaluate its second derivative and solve for the
singular control:
W ′′(t) = (−Cx+Kβx+Kα)′ = −Cx′+Kβx′ = (Kβ−C)(βx(N−x)−γx) = 0
W ′′(t) = Kβ2xN − CβxN − Kβ2x2 + Cβx2 + γ(Cx− Kβx)
Separating γ from the last equation, we get:
γ =
Cβ(N − x) − β2K(N − x)
C − Kβ
= β(N − x)
which is the expression that Sethi [3] gets for the steady-state solution as
well.
In our problem, we are minimizing the discounted costs (Cx+Kγ), so we
are maximizing its negative −(Cx + Kγ). The Legendre-Clebsch condition
for maximality is the following (Sethi 1981):
(−1)k
δ
δu
[
(
δ
δt
)2k
δH
δu
]
≤ 0
6In searching for connections between Miele’s method and the switching-point analy-
sis, it is worth noticing that W ′(t) is equal to the integrand inside the surface integral in
Green’s theorem.
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So, the singular control identified above is optimal when:
δ
δγ
d2W
dt2
(λ(t), xs(t)) ≥ 0
(C − Kβ)xs ≥ 0
From the expression for xs, this inequality is equivalent to:
Kα ≥ 0.
But K ≥ 0 (treatment is costly) and α > 0 (by assumption), therefore the
singular control is optimal.
4. Pulsing over unequal intervals
Having encountered multiple difficulties with the previous approaches
in which we alternate γ between γs + h and γt+1, we turn our attention
to a different kind of pulsing. In this section, we consider the strategy of
pulsing between minimal and maximal treatment effort over unequal time
intervals. This method is inspired by the solution that Sanders provides for
his discrete-time problem. Intuitively, if Sanders correctly claims that it is
optimal to alternate between γ = 0 and γ = b depending on the current
infection level, then we could think of the time periods of his model as very
very small, and hence extrapolate from his work that starting from xs, it is
optimal to chatter between effort levels of γ = 0 (no effort at all) and γ = b
in continuous time. Part 1 of this section focuses on laying out an analytical
framework for this exercise and identifying several difficulties of approaching
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this method analytically. Part 2 presents a numerical example that makes
use of this analytical framework and concludes a very important result.
Then, this numerical example is extended over an infinite-time horizon to
draw some useful economic implications.
4.1. An analytical discussion. In this first part, we will evaluate
the overall costs of applying a policy treatment γ = 0 over a fixed interval
[0, t1] and γ = b over a second interval [t1, t2] that is long enough to restore
the steady-state infection level at time t2 (we need to keep in mind that
γ ∈ [0, b]). Then, we will compare these costs to the costs of applying the
steady-state treatment policy γs over the entire time interval [0, t2].
For a fixed time interval [0, t1] during which we follow a minimum treat-
ment policy γ = 0, the infection level x1(t) is governed by the differential
equation
x′1 = βx1(N − x1) with initial condition x1(0) = x
s
The closed form solution for this initial value problem is:
x1(t) =
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt
where C1 =
N − xs
Nxs
At the fixed endpoint t1 of the interval, the value of the infection level is:
x1(t1) =
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt1
=
N
1 + C1Ne−βNt1
This will be the initial condition for the differential equation that governs
the second time interval [t1, t2]. Hence, the infection level x2(t) over the
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second time interval, during which we are applying a treatment effort γ = b
is driven by the differential equation
x′2 = βx2(N − x2) − bx2 with x2(0) = x1(t1)
The closed form solution for this initial value problem is:
x2(t) =
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)t(βN − b)
where the value of C2 is determined by the following equation:
x2(0) =
βN − b
β + C2(βN − b)
=
N
1 + C1Ne−βNt1
= x1(t1)
Notice that we are considering t1 to be the initial moment for the second
interval. We will account for this by discounting appropriately when calcu-
lating the costs. Also, we want x2(t2 − t1) = x2(∆t) = x
s, therefore, we set
up the following equation:
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)∆t(βN − b)
=
Kα
C − Kβ
From here, we can evaluate the length of the second interval that restores
the steady-state level of infection:
∆t = −
log
(
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
)
βN − b
So, the length of the second time interval is: t1 + ∆t = t1 −
log
“
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
”
βN−b .
The cost function for [0, t1] is:
∫ t1
0
e−αt(C
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt
)
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while the cost function for [t1, t1 + ∆t] is:
∫ −
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−α(t1+t)(C
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)t(βN − b)
+ Kb)
Therefore, the overall costs for alternating between γ = 0 and γ = b over
[0, t2] are:
∫ t1
0
e−αt(C
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt
)+
∫ −
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−α(t1+t)(C
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)t(βN − b)
+Kb)
The cost of applying γ = γs throughout [0, t2] is:
∫ t1−
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−αt(Cxs + Kγs)
We need to compare:
∫ t1
0
e−αt(C
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt
)+
∫ −
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−α(t1+t)(C
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)t(βN − b)
+Kb)
with
∫ t1−
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−αt(Cxs + Kγs)
which proves mathematically challenging. For this reason, we turn to a
numerical example to compare these two costs.
4.2. A numerical simulation. 7
The initial goal of this exercise (which was undertaken before we took a
deeper look in the optimization approach centered around Green’s theorem)
7The software Maple with 100 digits of accuracy was used for the computations of
this example. Maple was used also for most of the complicated algebraic manipulations
throughout this chapter.
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was to attempt to prove Sethi’s proposed optimal solution wrong by use of
a numerical counterexample. Indeed, we found one, which in light of what
we know now about the effectiveness of Miele’s technique, stands out as
quite odd. We present this (most likely anomalous) numerical result in this
subsection, kindly inviting the reader to identify any potential errors in the
procedure. We show that, starting from the turnpike infection level, the
costs of applying γ = 0 for a fixed interval [0, t1] and γ = b for an interval
long enough to restore the steady-state infection level xs are lower than
the costs of applying γs throughout these two intervals. Sethi argues that,
starting from an infection level xs, it is always optimal (i.e. cost-minimizing)
to follow a treatment policy γs and remain in the turnpike level xs as long
as possible. Clearly, this result should hold for any value of the parameters
of the population (β and N ) and of the cost function (δ, C, and K). We
will show that for a set of values for the parameters of the model, applying
γs is not optimal. Notice that the problem is approached in continuous
time (so we are not discretizing the time in unequal periods of length t1 and
t2 − t1, but rather applying γ = 0 repeatedly over [0, t1] and applying γ = b
repeatedly over [t1, t2], where t2 is dependent on t1).
Let β = 0.2, N = 100, δ = 0.4065696597... (which corresponds to the
value α = 0.9 in Sethi’s specification of the cost function, knowing that
e−α = δ), C = 2.5, K = 3.5, b = 25. The first step in this analysis is to
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evaluate xs and γs for these parameters. So,
xs =
Kα
C − Kβ
=
0.9 · 3.5
2.5 − 0.2 · 3.5
= 1.75
The corresponding γs is:
γs = β(N − xs) = 0.2 · (100− 1.75) = 19.65
We choose the length of the first time interval to be t1 = 0.00001, and
then solve for the length of the second time interval following the reason-
ing presented in Section 3.1. A thorough discussion of the numerical steps
followed to reach the results that we are about to introduce can be found
in Appendix C. We found that the difference between the cost of applying
γs = 19.65 and the cost of alternating between γ = 0 and γ = 25 is:
6.11 · 10−10
Therefore, once we are in the turnpike, it is better to alternate between γ = 0
and γ = 25 over carefully-chosen intervals (where the first interval is 0.00001
units of time long, while the second interval is long enough to restore the
stationary level of infection xs = 1.75 than to apply a steady-state treatment
effort γs = 19.65 8.
Now, we will extend the result obtained from the previous numerical
example to the infinite horizon. Let the set of two adjacent intervals over
which we first apply γ = 0 and then γ = b compose a phase. Then, the
8Notice that b > 1 and γs > 1 represent instantaneous intensity efforts, therefore they
can take values greater than 1.
4. PULSING OVER UNEQUAL INTERVALS 75
numerical example that we have already worked out considers one single
phase; our task is to extend the same strategy over an infinite number of
phases. A phase starts with the steady-state infection level xs, and it ends
with the same steady-state infection level. The infection level is perturbed
in between intervals within a phase, but then it is restored to xs during the
second time interval of the phase. Therefore, the phase length and the costs
for one single phase are the same for all the phases over the infinite-time
horizon. The only difference is that, from one’s perspective at t = 0, the
costs of later phases are discounted more heavily than the costs of earlier
phases. Given that we know the length of one phase, we can say that at
t = 0, the costs of the second phase are discounted by a factor of e−α∆t, the
costs of the third phase are discounted by a factor of (e−2α∆t, and so on,
the costs of the nth phase are discounted by a factor of e−α∆t(n−1), where
∆t denotes the phase length. Similarly, it can be argued that the costs of
the steady-state strategy that Sethi proposes can be discounted in the same
way.
In the numerical example, we have shown that the difference between
the costs of these different strategies is 6.11 · 10−10. When calculating the
infinite-horizon difference between these costs, we notice that:
∞
∑
n=1
e−α∆t(n−1)Costs/phase = Costs/phase
∞
∑
n=1
e−α∆t(n−1)
= (Costs/phase) ·
1
1 − e−α∆t
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Hence, the difference should be weighted by a factor of 1
1−e−α∆t
. In the
numerical example,
(6.11·10−10)·
1
1− e−α∆t
≈ 0.000014528631272132107723838190808570360240128981
11692201944940361772282038611307804603311789650058198431...
This is the difference between the costs of the two strategies applied over an
infinite-time horizon. In other words, this is by how much Sethi’s strategy
is more costly than the strategy that we propose in this example if we
keep applying these treatment levels forever. If we were to assign units to
the values of the parameters that we have been working with so far, we
could say that the total costs in the numerical example are in terms of
thousands of dollars, then the difference between the costs of the strategies
is approximately 14 cents. If the units were millions of dollars, the difference
would be about 14 dollars.9
Note: Appendix D contains two more attempts that we undertook while
struggling to understand the chattering policy and its advantages compared
to the turnpike policy. We saw it reasonable not to include this material in
our main discussion, but it might be useful to present these efforts for the
sake of completeness.
9Note that for this numerical example, the population was very small (N = 100). The
difference in the costs becomes even more significant as we consider larger populations.
Also, note that if we let the units of time be years, then these are costs per year. It would
follow that in the numerical example: t1 = 0.00001 years = 5.256 minutes.
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5. An w-extension of the dynamic programming argument
In this section, a reevaluation of the theorem provided in Sanders’ work
and presented in the introductory discussion of this chapter will be under-
taken. More specifically, we will write the difference equation in its general
form for the period of length w, and then we will investigate whether the
same results that Sanders establishes in the theorem still hold.
This exercise will attempt to mimic the proof of the weak concavity on
γ and the strict concavity on x of the value function provided in Appendix
A in the article by Sanders (Sanders 1971, 889). The proof will take the
length of the time period to be w = n . Alternatively, suppose we start with
a single period problem where w = 1, and suppose we divide that time
period in n smaller intervals. Then, we make all the necessary changes in
the cost function, the difference equation, and the bounds of the treatment
level so that they will reflect the change in the length of the time period.
Section 2 of this chapter has given a discussion of these changes; that section
has modified the control term from γ to wγ. In this section, we will keep γ
as it is in the formulation with w = 1, but we will change the upper bound
of the control from b to bn . This different formulation resembles Sanders’
suggestion about the equation for x(t + ∆t) (discussed in Section 1), while
making the necessary changes in the control set. The major goal of the
exercise is to check that the optimal solution is never an interior solution.
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If w = 1n , then the current-period utility function would be of the form:
U(x, γ) = Cn x+Kγ, where γ ∈ [0,
b
n ]. The difference equation governing the
changes in the infection level is: x(t + 1n ) = x(t) +
β
nx(N − x)− γx.
Knowing that V0(x) = 0 (where V0 is the value function at the end of
the last period), V1(x) =
C
n x. The condition V0(x) = 0 is analogous to a
transversality condition: there is no return from spending in treatment in
the last period, as it takes one period for treatment to become effective.
Then,
V2(x, γ) = min
γ
{
C
n
x + Kγ + α
C
n
(
β
n
x(N − x) − γx)} where γ ∈ [0,
b
n
].
So,
dV2(x, γ)
dγ
= K −
αCx
n
and
d2V2(x, γ)
dγ2
= 0.
V2(x, γ) is twice differentiable and its second derivative is non-positive, there-
fore the function is (weakly) concave with respect to the control. Also,
dV2(x, γ)
dx
=
C
n
+ α
CβN
n2
− 2α
Cβx
n2
.
So, for x < nαβ +
N
 , V2(x, γ) is increasing in x. Notice that as n → ∞,
V2(x, γ) will be strictly increasing for the entire domain of x. Taking the
second derivative with respect to x:
dV 22 (x, γ)
dx2
= −2α
Cβ
n2
< 0
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So, V2(x, γ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave on x. By induction,
we repeat the reasoning for all the previous minimizing value functions up
to Vn(x, γ).
Therefore, we see that the same results that Sanders concludes in his
work carry over to a framework with discrete time periods of length w. The
value function is increasing in x, and concave in both x and γ. Hence, the
optimal control is either γ = bn or γ = 0 for all n. In any discrete-time
model – no matter what the length of a certain period – the optimal policy
is a strictly bang-bang policy.10
6. Conclusions: Persistence of a (better-defined) puzzle
In conclusion, we would like to summarize the attempts that we have
made in our quest for the sources of discrepancies between discrete-time and
continuous-time optimal solutions for a specific SIS model with linear costs
and nonlinear dynamics. Our efforts have been channeled in four major
directions: 1) evaluation and generalization of the discrete-time dynamic
programming approach taken by Sanders to frameworks of time periods of
general length w, 2) validity check of the continuous-time optimal solution
identified by Sethi, 3) generalization of the argument made by Anderson and
Salant to continuous time, 4) modification of the argument of Anderson and
10We have extended this theoretical exercise to a numerical level as well, by setting
up a model (with the same parameter values as the ones that Sanders uses in his trachoma
illustration) and solving for the optimal policy for w = 1, 1
2
, 1
4
, 1
8
.
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Salant by analytically and numerically experimenting with the strategy of
pulsing over unequal time intervals.
While the major question that we presented in the first chapter of this
thesis still stubbornly persists - namely, why do we get different solutions
in discrete and continuous time – we have been successful in clarifying some
issues revolving around this puzzle. First, the application of discrete-time
dynamic programming to this problem is arguably reasonable. Dynamic
programming is a well-suited tool to problems where the decision times can
be divided into discrete pieces and the state space has a finite number of
values (Lenhart and Workman 2007). Both of these features seem to char-
acterize our problem. Furthermore, the solution that Sanders identifies in
discrete time is optimal for discrete-time models with periods of length w.
Secondly, the analytical generalization of the argument of Anderson and
Salant to continuous time seems to be particularly challenging mathemati-
cally. Thirdly, the solution that Sethi identifies in continuous time is correct;
this chapter has provided a second approach, besides the Green’s theorem
approach that Sethi takes to verify the optimality of the singular control.
Fourthly, we have been able to numerically find a pulsing control that dom-
inates the singular control in continuous time. This anomalous result might
be due to some conceptual error, or to potential limitations of the computa-
tional capabilities of Maple (the software used in this example); as of now,
we have unable to identify any errors in this example. Lastly, this work has
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raised the possibility that the problem might have not been translated cor-
rectly from the discrete-time framework to the continuous-time one. This
means that both Sethi and Sanders are providing us with distinct solutions
because they are not essentially solving an identical problem. To this end,
we have raised the issue of the size of b, the upper bound for the treatment
rate, in discrete and continuous time. While Sanders seems to explicitly
state that b cannot be any greater than one, Sethi does not provide any
upper bound for this upper bound. When interpreting his results, he even
considers the case when b → ∞ (Sethi 1974, 684). This raises more general
questions on how do we treat the inequality constraints on the control in a
control-constrained optimization problem when passing from a discrete-time
model to a continuous-time one. Section 5 of this chapter provides a possi-
ble suggestion on these questions, which is seemingly at odds with Sethi’s
continuous-time interpretation of b.
Lastly, we would like to remark that the controversy between Sanders
and Sethi is not the only, and maybe not even the first, time that economists
have encountered different-looking optimal solutions in discrete and contin-
uous time. Spence and Starrett (1975) provide a theorem that establishes an
instance when the most rapid approach path is optimal in the continuous-
time problem but not in its discrete-time counterpart. Under the time con-
straints of this thesis, we have not been able to investigate whether the
conditions of this theorem hold in the case of the problem of Sanders and
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Sethi, but further research might show whether Spence and Starrett’s results
are applicable or not.
The following chapter turns to a more recent debate that seems to be
related to, and at some degree even rooted in, the disagreement between
Sethi and Sanders. The resurfacing of this issue is further proof of the
persistence of the puzzle discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4
Essay Two: Good questions persist
“I wish I had an answer to that because I’m tired of answering that
question.”
Yogi Berra
This second essay will focus on a more recent pair of articles – the article
by Rowthorn et al. (2009) and the article by Anderson et al. (2011) – the
arguments in which are marked by the tension between discrete-time and
continuous-time formulations discussed in the previous essay. We will first
present the arguments made in each of the articles, highlighting the similar-
ities and differences between these arguments and the classical arguments
made by Sanders and Sethi. Then, we will apply the method of switching
functions to the continuous-time article by Rowthorn et al. A discussion
of the difficulties of obtaining analytical solutions in continuous time will
follow. Lastly, we conclude with a summary of the insights obtained by our
analysis.
1. Expository discussion
Both the article by Anderson et al. and the article by Rowthorn et al.
examine the optimal allocation of a limited per-period budget in minimizing
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the discounted social cost of the total infection level in two interconnected
subpopulations. So, the dilemma that the social planner faces is how to
divide the funds between the two subpopulations, given that these subpop-
ulations start off with different initial infection levels. In general terms, the
set of choices available to the social planner can be categorized into two large
categories: 1) policies that devote the entire budget to only one subpopula-
tion each period, and 2) policies that treat people from both subpopulations
in each period. As it will become clearer later in this discussion, the policies
in the first category can be viewed as strictly bang-bang policies, while the
policies in the second category can be treated as singular (or intermediate
solutions). This broad categorization of admissible policies will shape our
discussion of these two articles in the spirit of the classical debate covered
in the previous chapter.
Methodologically, these two articles differ in the time scale that they
choose in their models: one of the papers considers the problem in discrete
time, the other in continuous time. The article by Rowthorn et al., the
earliest of the two, considers the continuous-time model, and observes that it
is extremely difficult to obtain the optimal solution analytically. In order to
circumvent this difficulty, Anderson et al. transferred the model in discrete
time and employed dynamic programming to find the optimal discrete-time
policy. In order to keep up with the order established in the first essay,
we summarize the major points of the discrete-time article first, and then
proceed with the findings of the continuous-time one.
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The discussion in this essay is limited to the case of two subpopulations,
although both articles extend their results further to the general case of more
than two subpopulations. Also, we will limit our discussion to the case of
per-period budget only, although results can be obtained for the case of a
one-time endowment that needs to be managed over time as well. Having
set these limitations, we proceed with the article by Anderson et al. first.
The discrete-time minimization problem that Anderson et al. look at is
the following:
(4.1)
minimize
FA, FB
T
∑
t=1
δt−1(sAIAt + s
BIBt )
subject to I it+1 = (1− µ
i)I it +
βiI it + χ
iIjt
N i + N j
(N i − I it) − α
iF it for i, j = A, B,
with pAFAt + p
BFBt ≤ Mt, 0 ≤ F
i
t ≤ I
i
t ,
Mt
pi
≤ I it ≤ N
i,
and IA1 , I
B
1 given.
where I i is the number of infected people for subpopulation i, Fi is the
number of treated people in subpopulation i, si is the social cost due to an
additional infected person in subpopulation i, δ is the discount factor, µi
is the rate of spontaneous recoveries (lucky recoveries that happen despite
treatment) in population i, βi is the transmission rate in group i, χi is the
rate at which infected individuals in group j cross-infect people in group i,
αi is the success rate of the treatment, pi is the cost of treatment per person
in population i, Mt is the budget for use in period t, and I
i
1 is the initial
infection level in group i. While the more interesting case is the one that
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allows for interaction between the subpopulations, Anderson et al. start
their analysis with the base case χi = 0 and establish the concavity of the
SIS dynamics and the value function with respect to the infection level. As
it turns out, it is very easy to carry these results to the case when χi 6= 0.
The objective function in this minimization problem is linear in the state
variables IA and IB, while the dynamics of the problem are linear in the
controls FA and FB . The value function corresponding to this problem will
be:
Vt(I
A
t , I
B
t ) = min
FAt ,F
B
t
{sAIAt + s
BIBt + δVt+1(I
A
t+1, I
B
t+1)}
This linearity (or nonconvexity, as Anderson et al. refer to it) in the objective
function is problematic to the application of standard dynamic programming
techniques in the case when it is possible to treat every infected individual
in a certain group and use the left-over budget to treat some infected in-
dividuals in the other group. In such a case, in the backward recursion of
dynamic programming, every value function will have kinks (so it will not
be differentiable everywhere) and it will be only piecewise concave. The in-
clusion of the assumption of tight budgets (budgets that are not sufficient to
treat everyone in a certain subpopulation) reduces the state space. because
now we are not considering 0 ≤ I it ≤ N
i but instead we are considering only
a subset of it, namely Mt
pi
≤ I it ≤ N
i for a group i. So, the reduced state
space will now be a rectangle in the (IA, IB)-plane, with sides NA − IAt and
NB − IBt . As Anderson et al. argue, “the standard algorithm would first
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establish properties of the cost function and policy rule that hold over the
entire state space; only afterward would it use the initial condition and tran-
sition rule to determine the optimal trajectory through the subset of that
space” (Anderson et al 2011, 4). So, by modifying the standard dynamic
programming technique, Anderson et al. establish the strict concavity of
the value function with respect to the state and control variables for this
subset of the state space first. Then, they use this concavity to make the
argument that the optimal policy is always a corner policy.
The recursive nature of the dynamic programming techniques is very
helpful when establishing the strict concavity of the value function for every
period. In the last period, the value function will be linear in I i, as the
optimal policy is to treat nobody from either group. But, in the second-to-
last period, the value function is concave due to the concave dynamics of the
SIS disease that come into play through the recursive formulation of VT−1
in terms of VT . Once we have established the strict concavity of VT−1, the
value function of every previous period will be a sum of a linear function
(the momentary costs) and a strictly concave function (the value function of
the next period). The strict concavity of the value function with respect to
the infection levels implies its concavity with respect to the treatment levels.
Hence, the indifference curves (i.e. “level curves” of equal social discounted
cost) are strictly concave in the (FA, FB)-plane, while the budget constraint
line will have slope −p
B
pA
in this plane. Hence, the optimal policy will be
a corner policy that assigns all the available funds to the treatment of a
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portion of the infected individuals in one of the subpopulations only. This is
the heart of the dynamic-programming argument in Anderson et al. In the
next section, we will discuss how Sanders employs a dynamic-programming
argument that is very similar to this one.
Therefore, the major result in the work of Anderson et al. is the cor-
ner policy that they identify as optimal: when the (tight) budget cannot
be transferred from one period to another and there are only two subpop-
ulations isolated from each other, it is always optimal to focus treatment
on a single subpopulation only. Then, they show that this result holds in
the following three more general cases : a) when there are more than two
subpopulations, 2) when the subpopulations interact, provided that χi < βi,
and 3) when there is a one-time endowment instead of a per-period budget,
provided that in no period is there sufficient wealth to treat every infected
individual in every subpopulation. Furthermore, in the budget-constrained
problem with two or more subpopulations, Anderson et al. show that if the
subpopulations share the same infection dynamics, treatment price, and so-
cial cost (so they differ in the initial infection level only), the subpopulation
that will receive treatment will be the one with the lowest initial level of
infection.
Rowthorn et al. considered the continuous-time version of this problem.
In their analysis, they do not make use of the assumption of tight budgets,
because as we mentioned above, this assumption was employed by Anderson
et al. precisely in order to circumvent the difficulty of obtaining analytical
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solutions pointed out in the article by Rowthorn et al. Therefore, the upper
bound of F i is I i. The continuous-time problem is written in the following
form:
(4.2)
minimize
FA, FB
∫ ∞
0
e−δt(IA + IB)
subject to
dI i
dt
= (βI i + χIj)(N − I i)− µI i − αF i for i, j = A, B,
with c(FA + FB) ≤ M, 0 ≤ F i ≤ I i,
and IA0 , I
B
0 given.
Most of the notation is the same as before. The constant c denotes the price
of the treatment per person: this price is the same for both subpopulations.
If we compare this problem to the discrete-time problem discussed above, we
notice several differences. First, as we already noted, the treatment price for
each of the subpopulations is equal: pA = pB = c. Secondly, the marginal
social cost for each subpopulation is normalized at sA = sB = 1. In other
words, this problem is concerned with minimizing the total infection in both
subpopulations, assuming that an additional infected individual causes equal
social harm to his subpopulation in both groups. Thirdly, this continuous-
time problem is based on the assumption of identical populations. The
parameters β, χ, µ, N , and α that determine aspects of the spread of the
infection are equal in both subpopulations.
The optimization method used by Rowthorn et al. is Pontryagin’s Max-
imum Principle. The authors combine analytical and numerical approaches
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to evaluate the performance of three strategies under the assumption of lim-
ited budgets (i.e. when at least for some intervals of the time horizon, the
total number of infected individuals in the two subpopulations exceeds the
availability of treatment): a) treating in the region with higher infection level
first, b) treating in the region with lower infection level first, c) applying an
intermediate level of treatment in both subpopulations simultaneously. A
brief description of the analytical argument made by Rowthorn et al. is
useful for our further discussion in the third section of this essay.
The case when the available budget is sufficient to treat every infected
individual in each of the subpopulations is trivial in terms of minimization
of costs, as it is always optimal to treat everybody. Eventually, the infection
is either totally eradicated or driven down to some equilibrium in each of
the subpopulations. The case when IA + IB ≥ Mc is the one of interest
to us. Rowthorn et al. set the Hamiltonian function, which includes the
negative of costs, as well as two co-state variables λ1 and λ2 accompanied
by the dynamic equation for each of the subpopulations. The relationship
between the control variables FB = Mc − F
A simplifies the Hamiltonian;
we could rewrite the Hamiltonian function in terms of just one control, and
then attempt to maximize it in terms of that control only, say FA. The
Hamiltonian function is linear in this control:
H = −e−δt(IA+IB)+λ1[(N−I
A)(βIA+χIB)−µIA]+λ2[(N−I
B)(βIB+χIA)−µIB]
−λ2α
M
c
+ α(λ2 − λ1)F
A
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This linearity in the control makes it very easy to maximize the Hamilton-
ian when the coefficient before the control is nonzero. As we have seen in
chapter 2 and 3, problems arise when this coefficient is zero. By taking time
derivatives of this coefficient and setting them equal to zero, we obtain a
singular solution for the system. The most rapid approach path (MRAP)
will consist of reaching this solution as fast as possible and staying in it for
as long as possible.1 After identifying this singular solution, Rowthorn et
al. check its optimality. In order to prove that the most rapid approach
path is the less optimal of all possible paths, they replace −e−δt(IA + IB)
with e−δt(IA + IB) in the Hamiltonian function and show that this function
is concave in IA, IB, and FA. The concavity of the Hamiltonian estab-
lishes that the Mangasarian’s sufficiency conditions for maximality hold for
the most rapid approach path, which means that this path maximizes this
positive-cost Hamiltonian. Hence, MRAP is the maximizing, rather than
the minimizing strategy for this problem. We return to this argument in
the third section, where we analyze the optimality character of the singular
path.
Rowthorn et al. numerically establish that the optimal path is to treat
as many infected individuals as we can in the subpopulation with the lowest
1In the finite horizon problem, the optimal solution would be to apply this singular
solution for as long as it is possible, before deviating from it in order to meet the endpoint
requirement. In the infinite horizon, though, the optimal path is to stay in the singular
solution forever.
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level of infection first. Only after having treated all the infected individuals
in this subpopulation, the planner can use the left-over budget to treat
infected individuals from the other subpopulation. So, they claim that the
optimal solution for the continuous-time problem is:
if I i < Ij then Fi = min(Ii,
M
c
) and Fj =
M
c
− Fi
if I i = Ij then Fi = min(Ii,
M
c
) and Fj =
M
c
− Fi or vice versa
It is important to notice that the optimal solution that Rowthorn et al.
identify in continuous time is identical to the one identified by Anderson et
al. in discrete time, provided that the subpopulations are identical and the
budgets are tight.
2. Similarities and differences
This section will provide a comparison of the problem considered by
Sanders and Sethi (referred to as problem 1 hereafter in this section) and
the problem considered by Rowthorn et al. and Anderson et al. (referred to
as problem 2 hereafter in this section). The problems can be compared with
respect to: (i) their mathematical formulation, (ii) the economic context
captured by the model, (iii) methodology being employed, and (iv) results.
The first and the second aspect –the mathematical formulation and the
underlying economic context – are closely related. Problem 1 considers the
case of a single population, while problem 2 considers the case of multiple
populations, interconnected or not with each other. So, problem 2 has added
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a spatial context to the spread of infectious diseases. Also, this additional
feature complicates the problem, because the number of state and control
variables increases by increasing the number of the subpopulations. Sec-
ondly, both problem 1 and problem 2 are concerned with the optimization
of funds to control diseases of similar nature. Both problems have similar
SIS law of motions, although problem 2 accounts for spontaneuous recover-
ies from the infection as well. We anticipate that this difference does not
change much in the dynamics of the disease.
What is of major importance is the way in which the control enters the
law of motion in these two problems. In problem 1, the control is described
as a treatment effort: the planner is able to screen everyone, identify the
infected individuals in the population, and then treat them with a certain
effort level (which takes values between 0 and a maximal treatment level b).
In problem 2, on the other hand, the planner chooses the number of infected
individuals that will be treated, and each of them gets well with probability
α, which is the success rate of the treatment. The control variable in this
second problem is F i, which is also bounded between 0 and min{I i, Mc }.
Therefore, the control variable in the first problem appears as: x′ = f(x) +
g(x)u, while in the second problem it appears in the form: x′ = f(x) + ku
(where x is the state variable, u is the control variable, k is a constant, and
the problem is autonomous).
Thirdly, the momentary costs in both problems are of linear form. In
problem 1, the costs are linear in both the state variable and the control,
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while in the second problem, the costs are control in the state variables only.
The control does not appear in the cost. Also, both problems consider the
discounted costs over a finite/infinite horizon.
Fourthly, the existence of a budget constraint in the problem is of major
importance and economic significance. In problem 1, the planner needs to
minimize the costs of the control of an infectious disease without worrying
about any per-period budget or endowment constraints. This lack of a
budget constraint is compensated by the existence of an upper bound on the
treatment effort that can be implemented. In problem 2, the existence of a
budget (or one-time endowment) constraint imposes an upper bound on the
cumulative number of people that can be treated in both subpopulations.
Particularly, the assumption of a tight budget imposes an upper bound
on the number of the infected people that can be treated in each of the
subpopulations. Also, it might be useful to note that when the upper bound
on F i is simply I i, this upper bound is changing over time, unlike in the
world of the problem of Sethi and Sanders, where b is fixed over the entire
horizon.
There are major similarities between the approaches taken in solving the
two problems in discrete and continuous time. Sanders uses dynamic pro-
gramming in order to solve the discrete-time version of problem 1. As it was
thoroughly explained in the previous chapter, he exploits the concavity of
the value function with respect to the infection level and the treatment effort
in order to establish that the optimal policy is always a strictly bang-bang
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policy. The argument of Anderson et al. is very similar in nature: Anderson
et al. use precisely this strict concavity to establish that only one sub-
population should be treated in every period. Secondly, we notice that the
continuous-time versions of both problems require a discussion of the form of
the Hamiltonian function. Both Sethi and Rowthorn et al. make use of the
Pontryagin’s maximum priniciple. The scalar nature of the state variable
in Sethi’s problem enables the use of Green’s theorem in order to identify
the singular solution and confirm its optimality. Such an opportunity does
not arise in Rowthorn et al.’s problem, which has two state variables. The
switching function method can be employed in both cases: Sethi employs
this method in order to find the form of the concatenations of the optimal
solution, while Rowthorn et al. make use of the switching function, but do
not refer to it explicitly. Relatedly, the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch nec-
essary condition can be checked for both problems as well. The next section
will apply this condition to the continuous-time problem 2.
In terms of the results drawn for both problems in the four articles un-
der consideration, the major difference between the solutions obtained for
problem 1 and problem 2 is that the discrete-time and the continuous-time
optimal solutions agree in the case of the second problem but not in the
case of the first problem. Rowthorne et al. and Anderson et al. agree
that the optimal solution of problem 2 is to spend all the available budget
on treating one subpopulation only. Meanwhile, Sethi and Sanders don’t
agree on whether a strictly bang-bang solution is optimal. Nevertheless, in
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both these problems, we see the discussion of the same type of solutions
–namely, bang-bang and singular solutions. An interesting question is the
following: can we draw an analogy between what a bang-bang policy and a
MRAP is in Sanders’ and Sethi’s world and what it is in Anderson et al.’s
and Rowthorne et al.’s world? In problem 1, a bang-bang policy is that
you either treat as intensively as you can or you don’t treat anyone in the
single population under consideration. Similarly, in problem 2, a bang-bang
policy consists in the maximal treatment of the infected individuals in one
subpopulation and the total lack of treatment for the other subpopulations
(under the assumption of tight budgets). In both problems, a singular con-
trol signifies an intermediate level of treatment: in the case of only one
subpopulation, an intermediate level of treatment is between 0 and b, while
in the case of multiple subpopulations, an intermediate level of treatment
is between 0 and min{I i, Mc } for each of the subpopulations (so funds are
divided between all subpopulations). This similarity in the solutions that
appear in these two problems reinforces the fundamental similarity between
these two optimization problems and the persistence of essentially the same
issues for this class of problems.
3. Switching-function analysis of the continuous-time case
Continuing the switching function analysis started in the previous chap-
ter, this section will discuss the optimality of the singular solution identified
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by Rowthorn et al. The aim of this section is threefold: 1) to reinter-
pret Rowthorn et al.’s procedure of identifying a singular solution in terms
of the sign of the switching function, 2) to check whether the Generalized
Legendre-Clebsch necessary condition for maximality holds, and 3) to reeval-
uate Rowthorn et al.’s argument that identifies MRAP as the least optimal
solution.
The Hamiltonian function for the problem of Rowthorn et al. is the
following:
H = −e−δt(IA + IB) + λ1[(N − I
A)(βIA + χIB) − µIA − αFA]+
+λ2[(N − I
B)(βIB + χIA) − µIB − αFB ].
where λ1 and λ2 are the costate variables. Knowing that all funds that will
not be spent in one subpopulation will be spent in the other, i.e. FB =
M
c − F
A, we rewrite the Hamiltonian function in the following form:
H = −e−δt(IA+IB)+λ1[(N−I
A)(βIA+χIB)−µIA]+λ2[(N−I
B)(βIB+χIA)−µIB]
−λ2α
M
c
+ α(λ2 − λ1)F
A
So, now the Hamiltonian contains only one control variable, FA. As the
Hamiltonian is linear in the control, we can identify the switching function:
W = α(λ2 − λ1).
When W > 0, so when λ2−λ1 > 0, we need to make F
A as large as possible
in order to maximize the Hamiltonian. The opposite holds for the case when
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W < 0 (⇔ λ2−λ1 < 0). The problematic case is when W = 0 ⇔ λ2−λ1 = 0.
In this case,
(4.3) λ2 = λ1.
Then, we take the first time derivative of W and set it equal to zero:
W ′ = 0 ⇔ λ′2 − λ
′
1 = 0
From the canonical equations of the maximum principle, we know that:
λ′1 = −
dH
dIA
=
= −e−δt + λ2[Nχ − χI
B ] + λ1[Nβ − 2βI
A − χIB − µ]
λ′2 = −
dH
dIB
=
= −e−δt + λ1[Nχ − χI
A] + λ2[Nβ − 2βI
B − χIA − µ]
Therefore, combining equation (4.3) with these two last equations, we get
the following:
(4.4) λ′1 = λ
′
2 ⇔ I
A = IB
W ′ = IA − IB
The first time derivative has given us the singular state path, but not an ex-
pression for the singular control. We need to take the second time derivative
in order to determine the singular control:
W ′′ = (IA)′ − (IB)′ = 0
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After several algebraic transformations, and after taking into account equa-
tion (4.3) and (4.4), we get that:
W ′′ = −αFA + αFB = α(
M
c
− FA − FA) = α
M
c
− 2αFA
The singular control is:
(4.5) FA =
M
2c
= FB
In order to check whether the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition
holds, we notice that the singular control that we have found is of first order.
So,
(−1)1
d
dFA
W ′′ = (−1)(−2α) = 2α ≥ 0
Therefore, the Legendre-Clebsch condition for maximality does not hold.
The singular control FA = M2c is not optimal, as it does not satisfy this
necessary condition for optimality.
After having presented the switching function analysis and having veri-
fied that the singular solution is not optimal, we return to a brief discussion
of the method that Rowthorn et al. use in order to argue for the non-
optimality of the MRAP. In Appendix A.3. of the article (Rowthorn et al
2009, 8), the authors employ the Mangasarian’s sufficiency conditions for
maximality in order to show that MRAP maximizes, rather than minimizes
the total costs. They consider the Hamiltonian of the positive momentary
costs:
H = e−δt(IA+IB)+λ1[(N−I
A)(βIA+χIB)−µIA]+λ2[(N−I
B)(βIB+χIA)−µIB]
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−λ2α
M
c
+ α(λ2 − λ1)F
A
and show that if this Hamiltonian function is strictly concave in IA, IB, and
FA in a neighborhood around the singular control, then the singular control
maximizes the positive costs. In this exercise, I will extend the discussion a
bit further in order to show why this argument does not work for the original
Hamiltonian function, i.e. why cannot we establish the concavity of the
original negative-momentary-cost-based Hamiltonian in this same fashion.
The Mangasarian’s sufficient condition of maximality requires the following
Hessian matrix to be negative semi-definite:
M =








d2H
(dIA)2
d2H
dIBdIA
d2H
dFAdIA
d2H
dIAdIB
d2H
(dIB)2
d2H
dFAdIB
d2H
dIAdFA
d2H
dIBdFA
d2H
(dFA)2








After finding these derivatives:
M =








−2βλ1 −χ(λ1 + λ2) 0
−χ(λ1 + λ2) −2βλ2 0
0 0 0








M will be negative semi-definite if: i) λ1 ≥ 0, and ii) the determinant of the
matrix is nonnegative, i.e. 4β2λ1λ2 − χ
2(λ1 + λ2)
2 ≥ 0.
Up to this point of the analysis it is normal to wonder why is this analysis
any different for the original (−e−δt(IA + IB))-based Hamiltonian function,
given that all the terms in the matrix are second derivatives of this function,
which, due to the linearity of the cost function, are not affected at all by the
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sign of the cost function. Also, for λ1 = λ2 along the singular control path,
we notice that condition (ii) holds, provided that β > χ.2 The condition
that is dependent on the sign of the costs is condition (i). The costate
variable measures the marginal value of an additional infected person in the
population; condition (ii) requires an additional infected individual to bring
positive marginal benefits to the population. This clearly holds only if we
are aiming to maximize the number of infected people, not to minimize it
(which is the case when we aim to maximize the Hamiltonian containing
the negative momentary costs). When trying to minimize costs, the costate
variables are in fact nonpositive, following the same reasoning. So, this first
condition is the reason why we cannot establish the concavity of the original
Hamiltonian, which would give us the optimality of the singular solution.
The two exercises of this section have analyzed further why the singular
solution is not optimal for the continuous-time problem of Rowthorn et al.
4. Conclusions
This second essay has briefly reviewed two recent articles on the allo-
cation of limited funds to control the spread of an SIS infectious disease
throughout multiple subpopulations. The essay has argued that the prob-
lem considered in this pair of articles is very similar to the optimization
2It is sensible to assume that β > χ, which, in other words, states that the likelihood
that an infected person infects a susceptible person from his group is higher than the
likelihood that he infects a susceptible person from the other group, for instance, due to
the fact that the groups are geographically distant from each other.
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problem treated by Sanders and Sethi. Furthermore, this pair of articles
is characterized by a similar-looking tension between the discrete-time and
the continuous-time framework; what is different in this tension, though,
is that the tension is not due to the disagreement of the discrete-time and
continuous-time optimal solutions, but to the methodology used to reach
these solutions. Obtaining analytical solutions in the discrete-time frame-
work becomes possible only due to the additional “tight budget” assumption
that Anderson et al. include in their analysis. On the other hand, an analyti-
cal solution for the continuous-time problem is hard to find; the continuous-
time optimal solution is identified by numerical means only. Lastly, this
essay has extended the discussion of the non-optimality of the singular solu-
tion by employing the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition: this exten-
sion has provided us with an optimization problem that looks very similar
to the problem of Sethi and Sanders, but in which this necessary condition
fails.
To conclude, it is important to emphasize the fact that questions con-
cerning the superiority of bang-bang solutions over singular solutions and
vice versa continue to persist for this class of SIS optimization problems.
There is, apparently, something special in the structure of this problem that
creates tensions between these two types of optimal solutions. Had we had
more time to work on this recent pair of articles, we would have liked to
extend our discussion to the applicability of tools from continuous dynamic
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programming. More specifically, we would have researched on possible mod-
ifications of the standard continuous dynamic programming methods that
are analogous to the modified dynamic programming argument made by An-
derson et al. This would have most likely required for the inclusion of the
“tight” budget assumption in continuous time, which is not assumed in the
work of Rowthorn et al. Another potentially fruitful path would have been
to analyze the sensitivity of the Maximum Principle-based method explored
in Rowthorn et al. to the introduction of the “tight” budget assumption.
CHAPTER 5
Concluding remarks
“Funeral after funeral, theory advances.”
Paul A. Samuelson
This final chapter will briefly summarize some of the results drawn in the
previous two essays, discuss potential implications for public health policy-
makers, and review the old and new puzzles that have persisted throughout
or arisen along the analysis in this thesis.
1. Major results revisited
Our interest in the discrepancies between discrete-time and continuous-
time optimal solutions and optimization techniques originally arose out of
the recently published article by Anderson et al. This article seemed to
offer a way to bypass the difficulty of obtaining analytical continuous-time
solutions by a simple modification of the standard dynamic programming
technique in discrete time. The article naturally incited questions such as:
Can we identify any virtues characteristic of the discrete-time problem –
not possessed by the continuous-time problem – that enabled scholars to
obtain analytical solutions in discrete time but not in continuous time? Is
there any way to extend the argument of Anderson et al. in continuous
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time? If not, what is so problematic about continuous-time formulations?
As we investigated the literature on the topic, we noticed that a similar
kind of discrepancy between discrete and continuous time – albeit related to
the form of the optimal solution rather than to methodological difficulties
of obtaining analytical solutions at all – had marked this literature since
its beginnings, with the articles by Sanders and Sethi. This observation
enriched our research in ways that were unimaginable to us at the start of
this thesis project.
Issues with formulations of SIS control models in discrete and contin-
uous time arise out of the particular form of these optimization problems:
typically, the cost function is linear in the infection level and the treatment
control variable, and the law of motion of an SIS disease is nonlinear. In
the first essay, we evaluated the arguments offered by Sanders and Sethi,
and we concluded that as we cannot find any faults with their arguments
– in fact, we were able to check the optimality of the singular solution in
continuous time by an alternative approach as well, – we are bound to fail
to reject the hypothesis that the discrete-time and continuous-time optimal
solutions should be similar-looking. The time scale chosen in a model might
fundamentally alter the shape of the optimal solutions in discrete and con-
tinuous time. Secondly, in this essay, we have provided a numerical example
that examines the dominance of the singular control proposed by Sethi by
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a pulsing strategy. Given that we have analytically established the optimal-
ity of the singular control, such a numerical example strikes us as highly
anomalous.
The second essay returned the attention to our original interest on the
articles by Rowthorn et al. and Anderson et al. Although using a slightly
different specification in their model, these articles confirm the tension be-
tween singular and bang-bang controls and between dynamic programming
and Pontryagin’s maximum principle previously observed in the work of
Sanders and Sethi. By a comparative analysis, we noticed the similarities
between the two pairs of articles in terms of the model specifications, the
techniques being used, and the form of the optimal solutions. In the arti-
cles of Rowthorn et al. and Anderson et al., though, the singular control is
not optimal in continuous time. This shows the high sensitivity of the op-
timality of the singular control on the specification of the model: although
Sethi’s and Rowthorn et al.’s models are very similar, the singular control is
optimal in one but not in the other. We confirmed the nonoptimality of the
singular control in this case by employing the Generalized Legendre-Clebsch
necessary condition as well.
2. The conundrum of the “time scale effect” and public health
policies
The central problem of this thesis revolves around a normative mod-
elling issue: namely, how should we treat the flow of time in modelling the
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control of SIS infectious diseases? There are three parts to this dilemma:
1) an infection spreads in continuous time, 2) continuity of time implies
continuity of the state variable (the number of the infected people), while
in fact people get sick in a discrete fashion, and 3) decisions are made in
discrete time, usually in monthly or annual intervals. The question, then, of
how frequently we can make decisions depends highly on the type of the SIS
disease being fought, the type of treatment being applied, the technology in
screening and identifying infected individuals etc. The horizon chosen for
the model – either finite or infinite – depends on whether we are modelling
a seasonal infection or a permanent one. In a finite horizon problem, the
factors that determine the endpoint constraint, the target infection level,
are crucial. Also, in the real world, the limitations of our treatment capa-
bilities are always changing due to rapid medical advances. Budgets vary,
subpopulations merge, people die. All these issues need to be kept in mind
when attempting to draw implications of these models to the public health
policies intended to fight infectious diseases.
Admitting the real-world limitations, these models nevertheless offer a
general framework to guide our thinking of how to optimally control in-
fectious diseases under limited funds and limited medical capabilities. The
strictly bang-bang solutions of Sanders suggest that treating below your
maximal capabilities – at an intermediate level of treatment – is never op-
timal: you either treat everyone that you can, or you don’t treat anyone.
The singular solution of Sethi, on the other hand, aims to keep a stable
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number of infected people in the population. When applied to the real
world, though, “staying in the turnpike infection level” is not an easy task
to do: random disturbances will constantly drive the number of infected
people away from the turnpike, and the public health officials might need
to constantly apply bang-bang policies to get back to the turnpike. The
articles by Rowthorn et al. and Anderson et al., while being more unani-
mous on their recommendations for public health policies, suggest that the
region with the lowest level of infection should deserve all the funds first.
This is very counterintuitive because of two widely-spread misperceptions:
a) funds should be divided among populations, b) funds should go to the
areas where the infection levels are more dramatic first. So, these policy
prescriptions, while still debated and grounded in a quite abstract frame-
work, provide food for thought for policy-makers when dealing with optimal
ways to control SIS-driven diseases.
3. Puzzles: Old and new
We conclude this final chapter with a list of puzzles, old and new, that
have been present or have emerged while analyzing the discrepancies between
discrete and continuous time optimal solutions. While we have answered
some of our initial questions (under the time constraints and the mathe-
matical limitations present), many puzzles remain unsolved. The following
questions attempt to capture and formulate some of these puzzles:
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• Can we provide a mathematically rigorous argument that shows
why the singular solution is not optimal in discrete time in Sanders’
model, while it is in the continuous-time model in Sethi’s article?
• In the framework of a single population, would the continuous-time
solution analogous to Sanders’ solution look more like pulsing or
chattering? In other words, as the time discretization approaches
zero, does the number of switchings go off to infinity, or does it
remain finite?
• What could explain the anomalous numerical result that we have
presented in the third chapter?
• The behavior of the upper bound on the treatment effort in Sanders’
article as the time discretization becomes finer remains not fully
explored.
• Are there any other alternative ways, different from the ones we
have already pursued, to extend the argument made by Anderson
and Salant in continuous time?
• Are there any hidden factors that are making the solution of the
singular control optimal in Sethi’s problem but not in Rowthorn et
al.’s problem?
• How applicable is the discrete maximum principle to Sethi’s prob-
lem? How useful (if at all) is continuous dynamic programming in
extending the modified dynamic programming argument of Ander-
son et al. in continuous time?
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Starting from an infection level xt+1, we can find γt+1 that would restore
the infection level at xs in the next period. The difference equation for the
next time period is:
xs = xt+1 + w
(
βxt+1(N − xt+1) − γt+1xt+1
)
Substituting for xt+1, we can solve for γt+1:
xs = xs(1− wh) + w
(
βxs(1− wh)
(
N − xs(1− wh)
)
− γt+1x
s(1 − wh)
)
⇓
(5.1) γt+1 =
h
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1− wh)
)
Now that we have expressions for xs, γs, xt+1, and γt+1, we can calculate
the costs for these two periods:
δt
[
wCxs + wK(γs + h)
]
+ δt+1
[
wCxt+1 + wKγt+1
]
= δt
[
wC
(1 − δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
+ wK
(
β(N − xs) + h
)
]
+
+δt+1
[
wC
(1− δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
(1− wh) + wK
(
h
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1 − wh)
)
)]
(5.2)
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Dividing through by δt and simplifying the expression, we get:
[
wC
(1 − δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
+ wK
(
β(N − xs) + h
)
]
+
δ
[
wC
(1 − δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
(1 − wh) + wK
(
h
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1− wh)
)
)]
=
[
C
(1− δ)K
δ(C − Kβ)
+ wK
(
β(N − xs) + h
)
]
+
+[C
(1− δ)K
(C − Kβ)
(1− wh) + wK
(
1
hw − 1
+ β
(
N − xs(1 − wh)
)
)]
(5.3)
For a fixed value of w, we could rearrange the terms by isolating all the
terms that include h in them and labeling all the other terms as constants.
Therefore, the two-period cost function is:
constants + wKh − whC
(1 − δ)K
(C − Kβ)
+
wK
hw − 1
+ w2Kβxsh
= constants + wK
(
h − C
(1− δ)h
C − Kβ
+
h
hw − 1
+ βwxsh
)
= constants + wK
[
h
(
1 − C
1 − δ
C − Kβ
+ βwxs
)
+
h
hw − 1
]
(5.4)
Computing the limits:
lim
w→0
xs = lim
w→0
(
(1− δ)K
wδ(C − Kβ)
) =
Kα
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
γs = lim
w→0
β(N − xs) = β(N −
Kα
C − Kβ
)
lim
w→0
xt+1 = lim
w→0
xs(1− wh) = lim
w→0
xs −
Kh
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
1 − δ
δ
=
=
Kα
C − Kβ
−
Kh
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
rw =
Kα
C − Kβ
lim
w→0
γt+1 = lim
w→0
(
h
hw − 1
+β
(
N−xs(1−wh)
)
= lim
w→0
h
hw − 1
+βN−β lim
w→0
(xs(1−wh))
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= −h + βN −
Kαβ
C − Kβ
APPENDIX B
The closed-form solutions for the differential equations mentioned above
are:
x1(t) =
βN − γs − h
β + C1βNe−t(βN−γ
s−h) − C1(γs + h)e−t(βN−γ
s−h)
for (3.11), and:
x2(t) =
βN − γ∗
β + C2βNe−t(βN−γt+1) − C2γ ∗ e−t(βN−γ∗)
for (3.12). The constants C1 and C2 depend on the initial conditions of the
differential equation, so they depend on xs and x(t2) respectively. In order
to make this point clear, we can start with t1, at which x(t1) = x0 = x
s.
Then,
xs =
βN − γs − h
β + C1(βN − γs − h)
⇒ C1 =
βN − γs − h − xsβ
xs(βN − γs − h)
Our goal at this point is to find the policy γt+1 that we need to apply
to return back to the infection level xs at t3. The value of γt+1 depends
on x(t2), therefore we need to solve for x(t2) first, i.e. we need to find the
new infection level that has been caused by the perturbation in the policy
at time t1. As t2 − t1 = ∆t, then:
x(t2) =
βN − γs − h
β + C1βNe−∆t(βN−γ
s−h) − C1(γs + h)e−∆t(βN−γ
s−h)
where C1 is as determined above. Therefore, for the interval [t2, t3], the
initial level of infection is x0 = x(t2). In order to determine the value
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of the constant C2 that appears in the closed-form solution of the second
differential equation, we solve for C2 in the following equation:
x0 = x(t2)
⇓
βN − γt+1
β + C2βN − C2γt+1
=
βN − γs − h
β + C1βNe−∆t(βN−γ
s−h) − C1(γs + h)e−∆t(βN−γ
s−h)
Letting the right-hand side be denoted by x(t2), the value for C2 is:
C2 =
βN − γt+1 − βx(t2)
x(t2)(βN − γt+1
Now that we have an expression for C2, we can solve for γt+1. We know
that:
x(t3) = x
s
⇓
βN − γt+1
β + C2βNe−∆t(βN−γt+1) − C2γt+1e−∆t(βN−γt+1)
= xs
⇓
βN − xsβ = γt+1 + x
s
(
e−∆t(βN−γt+1)(C2βN − C2γt+1)
)
It is mathematically intractable to isolate γt+1 from this equation, as γt+1
appears in the exponential terms and in the linear terms of the equation.
Therefore, taking the limit of both sides as ∆t → 0 might be helpful in this
case.
lim
∆t→0
(β(N − xs)) = lim
∆t→0
(
γt+1 + x
s
(
e−∆t(βN−γt+1)(C2βN − C2γt+1)
))
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⇓
β(N − xs) = γt+1 + x
s(C2βN − C2γt+1)
⇓
γt+1 =
βN − xsβ − xsC2βN
1− C2xs
Nevertheless, this shortcut might cause trouble if we would like to calculate
the costs of treatment for time intervals that are not infinitesimally small.
We will refer to this point later.
At this point, we have determined the treatment level that need to be
applied at t2 in order to return to the stationary level of infection x
s. The
cost function for the interval [t1, t3] can be written as a sum of costs of the
intervals [t1, t2] and [t2, t3] (which are not equal to each-other because their
respective functions of the infection level and the treatment levels are not
equal). Hence, the total costs for [t1, t3] are:
∫ 0
∆t
δt1+∆t
(
Cx1(t) + K(γ
s + h)
)
+
∫ 0
∆t
δt1+∆t+∆t
(
Cx2(t) + K(γt+1)
)
and we are interested to evaluate it when ∆t → 0.
A
P
P
E
N
D
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E
S
1
1
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APPENDIX C
During the first time interval [0, t1], we will apply a treatment level of γ = 0, therefore the infection level x1(t) (the
infection level during the first time interval) is governed by the differential equation
x′1 = 0.2x1(100− x1)
Solving this differential equation for an initial level of infection x1(0) = x
s, we obtain the solution:
x1(t) =
700
7 + 393e−20t
We fix t1 = 0.00001. Therefore,
x1(0.00001) =
700
7 + 393e−20·0.1
= 1.7503439081859935877620046479877732293
94334679253640735713210615584041244294211790082845391477926928...
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This is the infection level by the end of the interval [0, t1]. At time t1, we switch to γ = b = 25. Hence, the differential
equation that governs the infection level x2(t) over the time interval [t1, t2] is:
x′2 = 0.2x2(100− x2) − 25x2
with initial value x2(0) = x(t1). Its closed-form solution is:
x2(t) =
5.4698247130812299617562645249617913418572958726675 · 1049
−2.187929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067 · 1048 + 3.3437929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067cdot1049e5t
We will apply γ = 25 long enough for the infection level to return to the steady-state level xs = 1.75. Therefore, we can
solve for the length of the interval over which we need to apply the maximum γ in order to return to that level of infection;
we need to solve the equation:
x2(t) = 1.75
5.4698247130812299617562645249617913418572958726675 · 1049
−2.187929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067 · 1048 + 3.3437929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067cdot1049e5t
= 1.75
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So,
t = 0.00003672863891041700491638102381714690545340082767018136926147114674617091865951016909922797271827706943
This solution of the equation tells us that the length of the second time interval is
t2−t1 = 0.00003672863891041700491638102381714690545340082767018136926147114674617091865951016909922797271827706943
Hence, the second time interval is
[0.00001, 0.00001+0.00003672863891041700491638102381714690545340082767018136926147114674617091865951016909922797271827706943].
At this point, we can calculate the costs over the two time intervals.
∫ 0.00001
0
e−0.9t
(
2.5 ·
700
7 + 393e−20t
)
dt =
= 0.00004375410181384388197072800021540151294352765137275529253614462726151151859465350050974699040136192886
∫ 0.00003672863891041700491638102381714690545340082767018136926147114674617091865951016909922797271827706943
0
e−0.9(0.00001+t
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(
2.5 ·
5.4698247130812299617562645249617913418572958726675 · 1049
−2.187929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067 · 1048 + 3.3437929885232491984702505809984716536742918349067cdot1049e5t
+ 25
= 0.003374373346917587433108636093785797215159392184588165267236789582263773572670643437429150750800314154
Therefore, the sum of costs for both intervals is:
0.003418127448731431315079364094001198728102919835960920559772934209525285091265296937938897741201676083
We need to compare this total cost to the cost of applying γs = 19.65 over both intervals (the solution of the respective
differential equation x′ = 0.2x(100− x) − 19.65x is the steady-state solution xs(t) = 1.75):
∫ 0.00001+0.00003672863891041700491638102381714690545340082767018136926147114674617091865951016909922797271827706943
0
e−0.9t (2.5 · 1.75 + 19.65 · 3.5)dt =
= 0.003418128059750366269824880251418245283046984672194205770391915487887588284751351111869646981561843345
The difference between the cost of applying γs = 19.65 and the cost of alternating between γ = 0 and γ = 25 is:
6.11 · 10−10
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Appendix D
In this part, we briefly introduce two alternative approaches that we have
explored in order to make sense of the numerical result discussed in 3.2. The
first one attempts to formalize an intuitive idea about chattering between
γ = 0 and γ = b at an instant. Because of the fact that the instantaneous
costs of applying a certain policy γ are linear in γ, the comparison of costs
between the case of applying γs and the case of pulsing between γ = 0, b
can be reduced in a mere comparison of treatment policies (weighted appro-
priately based on the share of an instant during which they get applied).
Therefore, we need to compare γs with limt1→0
∆t
t1+∆t
b, or alternatively, we
need to compare limt1→0(1 +
t1
∆t) with
b
γs . We have an expression for ∆t as
a function of t1:
(5.5) ∆t = −
log
(
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
)
βN − b
Therefore, in evaluating the limit, we can apply L’Hopital’s rule with respect
to t1. After several mathematical transformations, we obtain that
(5.6) lim
t1→0
(1 +
t1
∆t
) =
b
γs
This equality suggests that a chattering policy and an intermediate level
policy are equally costly in this framework.
The second analytical approach that we have taken deals with the ratio
of the costs of Sethi’s optimal policy and the chattering policy (in the rest
of this discussion, we will refer to the pulsing strategy between γ = 0 and
APPENDICES 120
γ = b as Sanders1 and Sanders2, as this pulsing strategy is motivated
by the optimal solution that Sanders provides). As mentioned above, the
overall costs for the pulsing strategy are:
(5.7)
∫ t1
0
e−αt(C
βN
β + C1βNe−βNt
)+
∫ −
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC1(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0
e−α(t1+t)(C
βN − b
β + C2e−(βN−b)t(βN − b)
+Kb)
So, we are interested in the following limit:
(5.8) lim
t1→0
(
Sethi
Sanders1 + Sanders2
)
Hence,
(5.9)
lim
t1→0






∫ t1−
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC2(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0 e
−αt(Cxs + Kγs)
∫ t1
0 e
−αt(C βN
β+C1βNe−βNt
) +
∫ −
log
„
βN−βxs−b
xsC2(βN−b)
«
βN−b
0 e
−α(t1+t)(C βN−b
β+C2e−(βN−b)t(βN−b)
+ Kb)






Because all these integrals approach 0 as t1 → 0, we apply L’Hospital’s Rule
in taking the limit, so:
(5.10)
lim
t1→0
(
Sethi
Sanders1 + Sanders2
)
= lim
t1→0
(
δ
δt1
Sethi
δ
δt1
Sanders1 +
δ
δt1
Sanders2
)
After several mathematical steps (see below for greater details), we obtain
the following expression for the limit of the ratio of costs:
(5.11)
lim
t1→0
(
δ
δt1
Sethi
δ
δt1
Sanders1 +
δ
δt1
Sanders2
)
=
b(Cxs + Kγs)
(b − γs)Cxs − (CβNx
s−KbβN+Kb2)b
βN−b
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We are trying to figure out whether we can specify combinations of
values of the parameters for which this expression is greater than 1, i.e. a
combination of parameter values for which Sethi’s strategy can be dominated
by chattering. For instance, notice that if we can find a combination of values
such that 0 < Cγsxs +
(CβNxs−KbβN+Kb2)b
βN−b < Cx
sb (keeping in mind that
xs = KαC−Kβ and γ
s = β(N − KαC−Kβ ), then it is certain that this limit is
greater than 1. The numerical simulations that we were able to run have
not yielded any useful results, but we have consistently obtained values that
are less than 1 for the limit expression.
Finally, notice that these additional analytical approaches are somehow
contradicting each other. The first approach establishes that a chattering
policy is as costly as a turnpike policy, while the second one leaves open the
possibility that these policies are not equally costly (numerical simulations
have shown so far that the turnpike policy dominates the chattering policy).
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